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THE EFFICIENCY NORM 
BROOKE D. COLEMAN* 
Abstract: Efficient is not synonymous with inexpensive. Rather, it refers to 
an optimal tradeoff between cost and function; a system may simultaneously 
become less expensive and less efficient, if cost savings are offset by loss of 
productivity. Yet, this Article argues that if we conceive of the rules and doc-
trines governing civil procedure as a product, the Judiciary, Congress, and 
federal civil rulemakers have confused cheap with efficient. They have made 
this version of “efficiency”—what this Article calls the efficiency norm—the 
dominant norm of the civil litigation system. This efficiency norm is problem-
atic because institutional actors falsely equate efficiency with the idea that lit-
igation must simply become cheaper. This has led to two profound shifts in 
key presumptions underlying civil litigation: the shift from a merits-based trial 
to non-trial adjudication and the shift from plaintiff receptivity to plaintiff 
skepticism. The Article argues that under a real efficiency analysis—one that 
weighs both the benefits and costs of making litigation cheaper—these now-
dominant civil litigation presumptions are dangerous and unwarranted be-
cause they further de-democratize civil litigation. Finally, this Article argues 
that the efficiency norm must be reclaimed. It proposes a reframed definition 
of efficiency and argues that such a definition will enable a better assessment 
and recalibration of the civil litigation system. 
INTRODUCTION 
As even the most novice student of economics knows, the term effi-
cient is not synonymous with inexpensive. Yet, if we conceive of the rules 
and doctrines governing procedure as a product, the Judiciary, Congress, 
and federal civil rulemakers are giving us a product that is cheap and calling 
it efficient. Efficiency—in and of itself—is not an odious normative value. 
Defined accurately, efficient changes to the rules and doctrines governing 
the civil litigation system would balance all costs and benefits, both pecuni-
ary and nonpecuniary.1 Efficiency would indeed be a worthy goal because it 
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would make the whole system work better. Stated differently, true efficiency 
would produce high-value civil procedure. The key, and this Article’s cri-
tique, is that institutional actors are using a flawed definition of efficien-
cy—what this Article calls the efficiency norm.2 This faulty conception of 
efficiency is not producing high-value procedure, but is instead resulting in 
cut-rate procedural rules and doctrines. 
The misapprehension of what efficiency really means is highly prob-
lematic. First, the focus on simple costs too narrowly defines efficiency and 
incorrectly excludes a comprehensive set of costs that, although more diffi-
cult to quantify, are critical to an accurate measure of efficiency. From pro-
posed changes to the discovery rules, to U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
about pleading and arbitration, changes are justified by reasoning that they 
will lower the cost of litigation.3 Yet, institutional actors tend to rely on a 
narrow category of costs that measure how much a defendant or plaintiff 
will have to pay at each litigation moment. Costs that are more difficult to 
quantify, such as the cost of mistakenly filtering out meritorious claims, are 
left out of the analysis. Relatedly, measurable benefits are not given ade-
quate weight; mere financial costs are privileged above all other interests. 
Second, institutional actors’ commitment to the efficiency norm has 
contributed to a shift in key presumptions underlying civil litigation in two 
critical ways: the shift from a merits-based trial to non-trial adjudication 
and the shift from plaintiff receptivity to plaintiff skepticism.4 For example, 
when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Civil Rules”) were adopted in 
1938, the rule drafters assumed that the ultimate goal of the system was to 
prepare each case for a trial on the merits.5 Modern rulemaking bears little 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See infra notes 60–162 and accompanying text. This efficiency norm differs from the effi-
ciency norm discussed in Richard Posner’s article observing how what he called an “efficiency 
norm” would benefit common law adjudication. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political 
Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 487 (1980). 
The “efficiency norm” as used in Judge Posner’s article argues that a common law system that 
maximizes wealth for all of society does not do so in an unfair redistributive way because the 
parties and the judges are guided by an efficiency norm. Id. at 505. A detailed discussion of law 
and economic literature’s definition of efficiency is in Part III of this Article. See infra notes 112–
162 and accompanying text. 
 3 See infra notes 60–162 and accompanying text. 
 4 See infra notes 164–249 and accompanying text. 
 5 See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 440 (1986) [hereinafter Marcus, Fact Pleading]. As de-
scribed by one scholar, 
Rather than dwell on pleading niceties, under the new system litigants were to use 
the expanded discovery mechanisms provided by the Federal Rules to get to the 
merits of the case. Armed with that information, they could in appropriate cases 
move for summary judgment, allowing the court to decide the merits. Normally, 
however, the proper method for resolving them was trial by jury. 
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resemblance to this past. The presumption is not one of trial on the merits, 
but is instead one of non-trial adjudication, whether that be by pre-trial dis-
position, settlement, or alternative dispute resolution.6 The second shift—
from plaintiff receptivity to plaintiff skepticism—concerns how the system 
views plaintiff requests, not just for relief but also for progressive steps 
within the system. For instance, the initial presumption under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure was to provide plaintiffs with access to discovery. 
The rules were fashioned with broad definitions of relevance and a system 
by which the producing party would have to demonstrate excessive cost or 
burden in order to resist production. The currently proposed amendments to 
the discovery rules—requiring a demonstration of proportionality in order 
to gain access to information—are but one example of how the discovery 
system has shifted from a presumption of plaintiff receptivity to a presump-
tion of plaintiff skepticism.7 Like the attitudes toward trial, this plaintiff re-
ceptivity-to-skepticism presumption has shifted at all levels of the civil liti-
gation system.8 These shifts, the Article argues, are unwarranted both be-
cause they rely on a false conception of efficiency and because they further 
de-democratize the civil litigation system. 
Although scholars have examined the time-worn tension between effi-
ciency and justice, little work has been done to unpack and critique the effi-
ciency norm itself. Scholars have adeptly critiqued the resulting civil litiga-
tion system for losing the civil trial,9 for being hostile to particular kinds of 
plaintiffs,10 and for becoming too cost-conscious.11 But, scholars have large-
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ary in managing and settling cases). The same can be seen in how the Judiciary and Congress 
approach procedural doctrine. See infra notes 233–249 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 164–249 and accompanying text. 
 8 For instance, Congress has adopted laws like the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 
which, in limiting a plaintiff’s access to discovery until after surviving a defendant’s motion to 
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 9 See Stephen B. Burbank, Keeping Our Ambition Under Control: The Limits of Data and 
Inference in Searching for the Causes and Consequences of Vanishing Trials in Federal Court, 1 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 571, 577–78 (2004) (discussing the risks in drawing too many conclu-
sions from one empirical data point, but discussing the vanishing trial nonetheless); Stephen B. 
Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Beth-
lehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 591 (2004) (arguing that “there is suffi-
ciently reliable evidence to believe that the rate of case termination as a result of summary judg-
ment rose substantially from 1960 to 2000”); Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation 
and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 408–
14 (2011) (arguing that the benefits of trial require thinking about how to bring some trial adjudi-
cation back into the system); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and 
Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 500–01 (2004) 
(documenting the precipitous decrease in trial rates). 
 10 See Brooke D. Coleman, The Vanishing Plaintiff, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 501, 503–04 
(2012) (arguing that changes in procedural doctrine have disproportionately and negatively im-
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ly accepted these changes as de facto;12 they critique the result and argue for 
ways to better function within the existing procedural paradigm.13 In other 
words, they argue that the delicate balance between efficiency and justice—
as outlined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1—is uneven within the sys-
tem as it presently exists. 
This Article argues that we should not be so quick to accept these 
shifts in the first place and that we should carefully reconsider what effi-
ciency means. It may be that settlement makes more sense now than when 
the Civil Rules were adopted in 1938.14 Moreover, the complexity of cases 
may require additional rules and thought, creating a litigation world that the 
1938 rulemakers might not have envisioned.15 Finally, the civil jury trial 
                                                                                                                           
pacted less-resourced plaintiffs); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double 
Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (2010) (“This Article finds that 
setting significantly higher and more resource-consumptive procedural barriers for plaintiffs and 
moving to the ever-earlier disposition of civil suits . . . runs contrary to many of the values under-
lying the Federal Rules.”); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and 
Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
286, 304 (2013) (“All of these manifestations of the backlash have been given traction by the 
Supreme Court, which seems to have placed a thumb on the justice scale favoring corporate and 
government defendants. These manifestations have impaired both access to the federal courts for 
many citizens and the enforcement of various national policies.”). 
 11 See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Li-
ability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1133 (2003) (arguing that “an unfettered commitment to ‘efficiency’ in 
the pretrial disposition context . . . will erode other systemic values”); see also infra notes 112–
162 and accompanying text (arguing that overemphasis on simple costs has contributed to a prob-
lematic definition of efficiency). 
 12 This discussion has been focused on the idea that the “liberal ethos” that informed the orig-
inal federal rulemaking endeavor has transformed into a “restrictive” one. This discussion, cov-
ered in greater detail in Part III section B, addresses the ethos transformation, but does not diag-
nose its origin. See, e.g., Richard Marcus, Confessions of a Federal “Bureaucrat”: The Possibili-
ties of Perfecting Procedural Reform, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 103, 109 (2007) [hereinafter Marcus, 
Confessions] (noting that recent Supreme Court decisions “underscore the extent to which the 
Liberal Ethos is in eclipse”); Marcus, Fact Pleading, supra note 5, at 439 (coining the term “liber-
al ethos” and observing that “Dean Clark and the other drafters of the Federal Rules set out to 
devise a procedural system that would install what may be labelled the ‘liberal ethos,’ in which the 
preferred disposition is on the merits, by jury trial, after full disclosure through discovery”); A. 
Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 353–54 
(2010) (“Indeed, I would say that a ‘restrictive ethos’ prevails in procedure today . . . .”). 
 13 See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713, 
1713–14 (2012) (arguing that settlement is the norm in civil litigation, so procedural rules and 
doctrine should be devised to better facilitate that norm). 
 14 See infra notes 22–59 and accompanying text (discussing historical changes in modern 
litigation). 
 15 See Marcus, Confessions, supra note 12, at 106–07 (“And those academics who shed their 
ideological views probably must agree that the most vigorous embrace of the liberal ethos could 
result in dubious outcomes (particularly in an era of billion-dollar verdicts and bet-your-industry 
decisions by a single jury).”). 
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may have “vanished,” and in some cases, that might be a good result.16 To 
be sure, multiple factors have moved the civil litigation system in this direc-
tion, but this Article argues we should be skeptical of the role the efficiency 
norm has played in these presumptive shifts.17 
Accordingly, Part I of the Article provides a brief history of civil litiga-
tion in the United States in order to contextualize the discussion of the effi-
ciency norm.18 Part II then examines how the current efficiency norm—a 
focus on a narrow set of litigation costs—has become the dominant norm in 
how institutional actors design procedural doctrine. 19 Actions taken by the 
Supreme Court, Congress, and federal civil rulemakers, as well as the rheto-
ric utilized by the public at large, demonstrate that these costs are often the 
sole concern. Part III argues against this conception of the efficiency norm 
and the way it has affected civil litigation.20 First, it challenges how effi-
ciency has been defined, explaining that the definition is often incomplete 
and inaccurate. Further, it argues that even under the efficiency norm, effi-
cient results have not necessarily been obtained. Second, Part III asserts that 
the efficiency norm has contributed to shifts in critical presumptions under-
lying civil litigation. These presumptions—the shift from merits-based trial 
to non-trial adjudication and the shift from plaintiff receptivity to plaintiff 
skepticism—have occurred over time and have been made at all institution-
al levels, including Congress and the Judiciary. In Part IV, this Article offers 
a path toward righting the efficiency norm.21 First, it critiques the now-
dominant civil litigation presumptions, arguing that they encourage the fur-
ther privatization of litigation, stifle public debate about legal develop-
ments, and de-democratize the court system. Part IV then concludes with an 
argument for a reclaimed efficiency definition—one that attempts to more 
accurately quantify less measurable costs, including, for example, the sys-
temic cost of inaccurately eliminating meritorious claims. 
I. MODERN LITIGATION IN AMERICA—AN OVERVIEW 
This Part is intended to contextualize the discussion of the efficiency 
norm and its attendant shifting procedural presumptions. Efficiency does 
not define itself, and these shifts do not take place on the basis of the effi-
ciency norm itself. They were formed and informed by what has occurred in 
civil litigation more generally. Thus, it is critical to understand the setting in 
which this phenomenon has developed. Yet, an exhaustive overview is be-
                                                                                                                           
 16 See infra notes 22–59 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 164–249 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 22–59 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 60–109 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 112–249 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 250–272 and accompanying text. 
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yond the scope of this Article. Instead, this Part will look at four key fea-
tures of American civil litigation from the late 1930s to the present: (i) civil 
case filing rates; (ii) civil trial rates; (iii) changes in substantive law; and 
(iv) the cultural dialogue about civil litigation. 
First, as the American population has grown, so have the absolute 
number of civil cases filed. In 1938, the year the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure were adopted, 33,409 civil cases were filed in federal court.22 From 
1945 through 1969, the number of federal civil cases filed annually ranged 
from 51,600 to 77,193.23 During the 1970s, the amount of civil cases filed 
per year nearly doubled from 87,321 in 1970 to 154,666 in 1979.24 By 1982, 
the number of cases filed annually had surpassed the 200,000 mark.25 The 
filing rate has remained above 200,000 ever since.26 Most recently in 2014, 
260,455 federal civil cases were filed.27 
Even though filing rates have increased, trial rates have done the in-
verse. In 1938, approximately 18% of civil cases that were terminated went to 
trial.28 By 1945, the percentage of civil cases that went to trial and reached a 
verdict decreased to 5.4%.29 That percentage steadily increased though, 
reaching an all-time high of 12.6% in 1968.30 The percentage held steady at 
around 11% until 1977 when it started to decline.31 Between 1977 and 1984, 
                                                                                                                           
 22 David S. Clark, Adjudication to Administration: A Statistical Analysis of Federal District 
Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 120 (1981). 
 23 Id. at 120, 126, 131, 138. 
 24 See DANIEL MCGILLIS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 4 (Frank D. Balog ed., 1987), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fcjs.pdf [http://perma.
cc/AM2C-MJ5W]. 
 25 Id. Specifically, 206,193 cases were filed. Id. 
 26 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE C-4: U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL CASES 
TERMINATED, BY NATURE OF SUIT AND ACTION TAKEN, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING 
DECEMBER 31, 2014, at 1 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/18268/download [http://perma.cc/
SA6Z-RC4S] [hereinafter TABLE C-4]. 
 27 Id. Population statistics explain this growth to a degree. In 1938, there were approximately 
130 million people residing in the United States, according to census data. Historical National Popu-
lation Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (last updated June 28, 2000), http://www.census.gov/popest/
data/national/totals/pre-1980/tables/popclockest.txt [http://perma.cc/T6NZ-PEPB]. That number had 
nearly doubled by the mid-1990s. See id. As of July 1, 1994, there were 260,327,021 people. Id. 
 28 Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. 
L. REV. 631, 633 n.3. Today’s population estimate is over 300 million. Annual Estimates of the 
Resident Populations: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2014), 
http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=PEP_2014_PEP
ANNRES&src=pt [http://perma.cc/F97E-4NT4]. 
 29 Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 
558 tbl.1 (1986). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
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the percentage of trials decreased from 9.9% to 5.9%.32 It has been steadily 
decreasing ever since. Today, the trial rate hovers around 1.1%.33 
What this means in terms of the absolute number of trials is of interest. 
In 1945, 2835 cases went to trial.34 In 1968, when the trial rate was 12.6%, 
the number of trials was 8688.35 From 1977 to 1984, this metric ranged 
from 11,604 to 14,374.36 Yet, the number of trials in 2014 was 2920.37 In 
other words, even though the number of civil cases filed has increased dras-
tically since 1945, the absolute number of trials currently is almost equal to 
that of 1945—approximately 3000 trials per year. 
What has created the increased civil filing rates but decreased trial 
rates is a complicated question to which there is no straightforward answer. 
Part of that story, however, is that changes in the substantive law have af-
fected civil litigation. More specifically, the creation of additional substan-
tive rights has impacted civil filing rates. Starting in the 1950s, but really 
taking off in the 1970s, Congress began creating myriad federal legal rights 
and remedies. These changes were, for the most part, controversial, and 
they necessarily increased the kinds of claims that could be brought. This 
led to higher civil filing rates.38 Federal laws like Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 39 and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (“RICO”)40 created federal substantive rights and private modes of en-
forcement that had never before existed.41 Many of these new laws also 
provided for attorney’s fees, creating greater incentives for lawyers to take 
on more cases.42 Moreover, the criminal caseload for federal judges in-
                                                                                                                           
 32 Id. 
 33 TABLE C-4, supra note 26, at 1; see also Galanter, supra note 9, at 460–61 (examining the 
decrease in trial rates and absolute number of trials in American courts). 
 34 Resnik, supra note 29, at 558 (outlining the number of completed civil trials from 1945 
through 1984). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 TABLE C-4, supra note 26, at 1 (identifying the number of federal civil cases terminated in 
2014 by nature of lawsuit and method of termination). 
 38 See id.; Miller, supra note 11, at 992 (discussing how the increase in number of legal reme-
dies available led to increased litigation). 
 39 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2012). 
 40 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012). 
 41 See Theodore Eisenberg, State Law in Federal Civil Rights Cases: The Proper Scope of 
Section 1988, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 499 (1980) (“In the 1960s vindication of individual rights 
through expansions in constitutional doctrine became commonplace. Although the Burger Court 
slowed that trend, it has continued and in some respects expanded another trend in federal law—
the protection of individual rights by means of federal civil rights statutes.”); Richard B. Stewart 
& Cass R. Sunstein, Public Program and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1195–96 (1982) 
(discussing the range of cases federal courts recognize that pit individuals against government 
agencies). 
 42 Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 396–97 (1982). 
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creased due to the federalization of crimes.43 The combination of additional 
substantive rights and this increase in judges’ criminal docket was a large 
part of the increase in the overall federal judicial caseload. 
Finally, in the ether of all of these statistics and the creation of substan-
tive rights lies the cultural and political debate about civil litigation. From 
the 1930s until the late 1960s and early 1970s, cultural attitudes about liti-
gation were generally positive.44 That attitude has perceptibly moved. By 
the mid-to-late 1970s, popular culture’s view of litigation was generally 
negative.45 In 1978, a U.S. News & World Report article pondered Why Eve-
rybody is Suing Everybody.46 The perception was that our society had be-
come more litigious.47 Individuals appeared no longer able to resolve their 
disputes—whatever their merit—without going to court. Moreover, these dis-
putes were viewed and portrayed as petty. The McDonald’s coffee spill case 
is the paradigmatic example—a case where the media and the public agreed 
that suing McDonald’s for the temperature of its coffee was frivolous.48 
The media and the public were not alone in their assessment of the civ-
il litigation system. Judges and lawmakers joined in this debate. Judges 
complained of a litigation system gone astray. Legislators began attempting 
to rein in the perceived litigation explosion through “tort reform” and other 
limitations on bringing disputes.49 Finally, corporations became major play-
                                                                                                                           
 43 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 59–95 (2d 
ed., 1996). 
 44 See Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t 
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. 
REV. 4, 9–10 (1983) (stating “[w]e should remind ourselves just how recent this [negative] per-
ception of [litigation] is,” and noting that it was not until the mid to late 1970s that the “spectre of 
litigiousness was fully visible”). 
 45 Id. at 7–11. 
 46 David F. Pike, Why Everybody Is Suing Everybody, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 4, 
1978, at 50, 50. 
 47 Galanter, supra note 44, at 6–11 (discussing negative public sentiment regarding supposed 
litigation explosion). 
 48 See Liebeck v. McDonald’s Rests., No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309 (N.M. Dist. Aug. 
18, 1994), vacated, No. CV-93-02419, 1994 WL 16777704 (N.M. Dist. Nov. 28, 1994); Kevin G. 
Cain, And Now, the Rest of the Story . . . About the McDonald’s Coffee Lawsuit, HOUS. LAW, 
July/Aug. 2007, at 25 (noting derisive reaction by the public and media to the McDonald’s coffee 
lawsuit). But see HOT COFFEE (HBO documentary broadcast June 27, 2011) (showing that the 
victim’s injuries were severe and that McDonald’s arguably knew that its product was dangerous). 
 49 Many of these reforms took place at the state level and included caps on damage awards. 
See, e.g., Jane C. Arancibia, Note, Statutory Caps on Damage Award in Medical Malpractice 
Cases, 13 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 135, 141 (1988) (“During 1986, fifteen states passed legislation 
that limited the amount of recovery for noneconomic losses.”). For more on tort reform, see gen-
erally Edward White, Tort Reform in the Twentieth Century: An Historical Perspective, 32 VILL. 
L. REV. 1265 (1987) (surveying tort reform in the areas of strict liability, comparative negligence, 
and workers’ compensation). 
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ers in the attempt to reduce litigation.50 They lobbied lawmakers and con-
tinue to shape the public debate about litigation.51 
In other words, the civil litigation system became a focus of public, 
corporate, and media attention. The question is whether that focus is valid. 
In contrast to the media portrayals, scholars like Marc Galanter have disput-
ed the premise that the country is more litigious, citing myriad factors like 
the growth in the number of lawyers, the complexity of claims, and in-
creased awareness of remedies as reasons why the litigation world looks 
and feels bigger.52 The argument proffers that litigation has taken on a more 
“symbolic presence,” with “more big time, major league litigation involving 
major institutions and/or pathbreaking claims.”53 This means that there is 
“absolutely, if not proportionately, more ‘law stuff’ that invites media cov-
erage with its built-in bias toward the dramatic, the novel, the deviant, to-
ward innovation and conflict.”54 This affects society’s perception of litiga-
tion, but it is not necessarily reality. 
The reality, scholars argue, is more nuanced.55 Although there is no 
perfect data, historical rates demonstrate that Americans are not necessarily 
more litigious now than they were a century ago. Moreover, when com-
                                                                                                                           
 50 See Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling Act, 
and the Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 90 MINN. 
L. REV. 1303, 1314 (2006) (“Rules [11, 23, and 26] are just a few of the Rules that directly impli-
cate tort-reform issues and have therefore become the subject of debate and the object of lobbying 
efforts by interest groups such as consumer-advocacy organizations, large corporations, and trial 
lawyers associations.” (footnotes omitted)); Christopher J. Roederer, Democracy and Tort Law in 
America: The Counter-Revolution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 647, 677–78 (2008) (“The current wave of 
tort ‘reform’ is tied to a systematic and coordinated campaign ‘by an army of corporations, foun-
dations, lobbyists, litigation centers, think tanks politicians and academics,’ to unmake or undo 
developments over the last 100 years across the common law.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 51 For example, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has commended the American Tort Reform 
Association (“ATRA”) for its annual Judicial Hellholes publication. See, e.g., Judicial Hellholes 
Report Spotlights Problem Civil Justice Jurisdictions, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 
(Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/judicial-hellholes-report-spotlights
-problem-civil-justice-jurisdictions [http://perma.cc/35YD-89S3]. This ATRA publication chronicles 
what it argues are the worst lawsuit jurisdictions for corporations by “documenting developments in 
places where judges in civil cases systematically apply laws and court procedures in an unfair and 
unbalanced manner, generally against defendants.” AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, JUDICIAL HELL-
HOLES 2013/2014, at 2 (2013), http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Judicial
Hellholes-2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/6PPS-54AN] [hereinafter JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2013/2014]. 
 52 See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 44, at 48, 69–71 (summarizing alternative explanations for 
the public perception of a “litigation explosion”). 
 53 Id. at 49–50. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See id. at 69–71 (criticizing “litigation explosion” scholarship, in part, for overstating in-
complete data); see also Miller, supra note 11, at 990–96 (discussing the alleged litigation explo-
sion and noting that “the supposed litigation crisis is the product of assumption; that reliable em-
pirical data is in short supply; and that data exist that support any proposition”). 
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pared to other countries, the same is true.56 When one looks at the potential 
number of grievances a population might have, the actual rates involving a 
third party, such as a court, are fairly small. For example, one study deter-
mined that over twenty-five percent of individuals with middle-range griev-
ances (those defined as worth $1000 or more) did not take that grievance to 
the next level, meaning they did not do anything to make the alleged of-
fending party aware of their potential claim.57 This does not mean that the 
remaining seventy-five percent of individuals filed a court claim. To the 
contrary, about two-thirds of these remaining claims led to disputes between 
the parties, but even then almost half of those disputes ended in agreement 
without any third-party intervention.58 In other words, these individuals did 
not even engage the civil litigation system. As scholars have argued, 
“[E]mpirical studies show that most Americans do not rush to court with 
every petty grievance. Notwithstanding occasional silly lawsuits, Americans 
lump most of their legitimate grievances rather than litigate.”59 
In spite of these studies, the litigation system is perceived as being 
fraught with abuse. The combination of an increase in filing rates, decrease 
in trial rates, and changes in the nature of substantive claims has resulted in 
a palpable fervor over the civil litigation system. At least one result of this 
fervor, as this Article will show, is the current efficiency norm. 
II. THE EFFICIENCY NORM 
This Part of the Article discusses how institutional actors define effi-
ciency. Rather than considering a range of costs and benefits, the U.S. Su-
preme Court, Congress, and rulemakers view a particular kind of litigation 
costs as the near-exclusive concern. This singular focus has given rise to the 
current efficiency norm. 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See generally Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3 
(1986) (arguing that Americans are not more litigious than they were in the recent past and are not 
any more litigious that individuals in other industrialized countries). 
 57 Galanter, supra note 44, at 13–14 (discussing study that defined and quantified “grievanc-
es,” “claims,” and “disputes”). 
 58 Id. at 16–17. 
 59 Burbank & Subrin, supra note 9, at 403; see also Anne Underwood, Would Tort Reform 
Lower Costs?, N.Y. TIMES: PRESCRIPTIONS (Aug. 31, 2009, 3:45 PM), http://prescriptions.blogs.
nytimes.com/2009/08/31/would-tort-reform-lower-health-care-costs/ [http://perma.cc/8AMB-HSY8] 
(including a discussion with Professor Tom Baker, who argues that the argument that health care 
costs are driven up by frivolous lawsuits is “ludicrous”). 
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A. From Nuance to Simple Costs 
1. A Singular Focus on Costs 
When Rule 1, describing the scope and purpose of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, was adopted in 1938, the words appeared to animate a bal-
ance between the need to efficiently administer the civil justice system and 
to fairly adjudicate litigant claims. It stated that the rules “should be con-
strued to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action and proceeding.”60 Currently, the venerable Rule 1 is set to be 
amended to include the admonition that in addition to construing and ad-
ministering the rules, the courts and parties must “employ” the rules in or-
der to secure Rule 1’s ends.61 This proposed change reflects the sense that 
improvements to the “administration of civil justice regularly include pleas 
to discourage overuse, misuse, and abuse of procedural tools that increase 
cost and result in delay.”62 In other words, in changing Rule 1, the rulemak-
ers’ stated focus is cost, or to put a finer point on it, finding a way to reduce 
the costs of civil litigation that result from abusive litigation. 
This is in contrast to the more nuanced conception of “just, speedy, and 
inexpensive” proposed by the original rulemakers. Worried about hyper-
technical rules of procedure that had been applied to prevent parties from 
reaching the merits, these rulemakers created a system that was intended to 
weigh how cost and delay could get in the way of reaching a just outcome: 
A complicated procedure is the boon of the sophisticated, the ex-
pert, in short for the well-heeled. We need to look back only at the 
jungle [before the rules], when it was unsafe to appear in the fed-
eral courts without a local expert, to see how perilous this was for 
                                                                                                                           
 60 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
 61 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY AND 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 281 (2013), http://www.hib.uscourts.gov/news/archives/attach/preliminary-draft-
proposed-amendments.pdf [http://perma.cc/99K8-JS23] [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PRO-
POSED AMENDMENTS]. 
 62 Id. The Committee note continues, “Effective advocacy is consistent with—and indeed 
depends upon—cooperative and proportional use of procedure.” Id. Rule 1 was amended in 1993 
to add the words “and administered” after “construed.” Robert G. Bone, Improving Rule 1: A 
Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 287, 298 (2010). This change “was part 
of a package of amendments aimed at strengthening judicial case management and controlling 
litigation costs.” Id. Absent congressional action, the amendment requiring courts and parties to 
“employ” the Federal Rules will take effect on December 1, 2015. Pending Rules Amendments, 
U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/pending-rules-amendments [http://perma.cc/
7CZM-MZ83]. 
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all except the few in the know. Now all this is changed in a truly 
revolutionary way.63 
The original rulemakers were not exclusively focused on substantive values. 
As scholars have argued, the values underlying the original rules were 
“practical values of administrative design, such as efficiency (understood 
narrowly as minimizing administrative cost), simplicity, and flexibility.”64 
Efficiency, in their minds, meant reaching a result with the least amount of 
administrative obfuscation.65 For example, “efficiency” meant having flexi-
ble rules of joinder so that if a plaintiff failed to include a defendant origi-
nally, the plaintiff could add that party without starting all over.66 The origi-
nal rulemakers thought of efficiency not as a straight cost calculation, but as 
a way to unburden civil litigation of needless administrative distraction.67 
The current focus shifted, it appears, to reaching a result as cheaply as pos-
sible. In other words, a premium is placed on assessing the raw cost of each 
litigation moment without much regard for other potentially more nuanced 
costs that should be considered. These narrow costs have become the cur-
rent focus. 
The studies conducted in connection with the currently proposed dis-
covery rule amendments are apposite. The most controversial of the pro-
posals is the introduction of the concept of proportionality into Rule 
26(b)(1)’s scope of discovery definition. The original rule defined discover-
able information as that which was relevant to the litigation. The proposed 
revision expands that definition to include the idea that the discovery must 
be “proportional to the needs of the case.”68 The rule goes on to define pro-
portionality with six factors. Five of these factors are taken from Rule 
26(b)(2)(C), which is a section of the discovery rules that explicitly granted 
the court power to limit discovery. Those factors—whether the “burden or 
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,” “the 
amount in controversy,” “the parties’ resources,” “the importance of the is-
                                                                                                                           
 63 See Charles E. Clark, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Rule-Making, in PROCE-
DURE—THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS OF CHARLES E. CLARK 115, 121 (Charles A. Wright 
& Harry M. Reasoner eds., 1965). 
 64 Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legiti-
macy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 895 (1999); see also David Marcus, The Past, 
Present, and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 
380–81 (2010) (arguing that early rulemakers “shared a consistent normative assumption for the 
proper purpose of procedural rules: they have no independent goals of their own and instead exist 
to provide for the efficient resolution of cases on their substantive merits”). 
 65 Bone, supra note 64, at 895 & n.37 (noting that procedure reformers equated efficiency 
with administrative streamlining). 
 66 Marcus, supra note 64, at 394–95 (contrasting the historical judicial approach to joinder 
with the more permissive joinder language of Rule 18). 
 67 Bone, supra note 62, at 293 (discussing a procedure reformer’s view of efficiency). 
 68 PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 61, at 289–90. 
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sues at stake,” and the “importance of discovery in resolving the issues”—
were joined by one additional factor: “the parties’ relative access to relevant 
information.”69 
The studies conducted in support of the proportionality change focused 
on the cost of discovery and whether it was proportional to the value of the 
case.70 One study by the Federal Judicial Center found that the median dis-
covery costs for plaintiffs amounted to $15,000, and the median costs for 
defendants amounted to $20,000.71 A related study determined that higher 
costs are associated with cases where the parties have more at stake.72 More 
specifically, for both plaintiffs and defendants, the study found a 1% in-
crease in stakes was associated with a 0.25% increase in total discovery 
costs.73 Critics of proportionality argue that this makes sense. When the par-
ties to the litigation have more at risk, they will spend more to litigate their 
case. Nonetheless, proponents of the rule change have studies to support 
their position as well. In a survey by the Institute for the Advancement of 
the American Legal System, a survey of corporate counsel revealed that 
90% of the time these counsel believe that discovery costs in federal court 
are not proportional to the value of the case.74 Moreover, the Civil Rules 
Committee acknowledged that it may only be a small number of cases that 
experience high discovery costs. Yet, it argued a rule change was in order 
because those high stakes cases had to be addressed.75 
                                                                                                                           
 69 U.S. COURTS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE–APRIL 2014, at 
79–80, 97–98 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20
Books/Civil/CV2014-04.pdf [http://perma.cc/64Q2-G4QR] [hereinafter 2014 ADVISORY COMM. 
ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] (reprint of the Report of the Duke Conference Subcommittee). 
Current Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) reads, “the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs 
its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ re-
sources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in 
resolving the issues.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
 70 2014 ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 69, at 83. 
 71 EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASE-BASED 
CIVIL RULES SURVEY, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COM-
MITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (2009), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/
dissurv1.pdf [http://perma.cc/8WPH-USEZ]. This study surveyed more than 2000 lawyers (half 
plaintiff and half defense) for its study and looked at all cases terminated in federal court during 
the fourth quarter of 2008. Id. at 5, 7 n.4, 85. 
 72 EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION COSTS IN 
CIVIL CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 5, 7 (2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/costciv1.pdf/
$file/costciv1.pdf [http://perma.cc/BY2K-WJ4S]. 
 73 Id. 
 74 2014 ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 69, at 83. One study 
by the American College of Trial Lawyers Task Force on Discovery found that almost half of the 
respondents “believed that discovery is abused in almost every case, with responses being essen-
tially the same for both plaintiff and defense lawyers.” Id. 
 75 Id. at 4–16.  
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These surveys and the rulemakers’ response are revealing with respect 
to the efficiency norm. All of the studies—whether pro-discovery or anti-
discovery—focused soleley on the pecuniary cost of discovery. With the 
exception of the studies that connected the costs to the stakes of the case, 
the studies made no attempt to contextualize the cost by valuing and evalu-
ating the benefits of the litigation.76 This shows the widespread belief that 
efficiency is acheived when reform makes litigation cheaper—without re-
gard to other kinds of costs.77 
The U.S. Supreme Court is similarly guided by this allegiance to costs. 
The Court’s most recent pleading cases, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly78 in 
2007 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal in 2009,79 both of which held plaintiffs to a high-
er pleading standard, are illuminating. In Twombly, the Court explained that 
Rule 8 required a stricter reading because “the threat of discovery expense 
will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before 
reaching” proceedings such as summary judgment.80 Similarly, in Iqbal, the 
Court reasoned that “[l]itigation . . . exacts heavy costs in terms of efficien-
cy and expenditure of valuable time and resources,” requiring the Court to 
move its focus from the possibility of discovery for plaintiffs to the “bur-
dens of discovery” for the defendants.81 In other words, the Court explained 
its decisions, in part, in terms of costs accrued by the defendant in litigation. 
This focus on raw costs is found in other cases as well. For example, in 
the 2011 decision in AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion,82 the Supreme 
Court rejected plaintiffs’ attempt to arbitrate as a class under their commer-
cial agreement with AT&T.83 Much of the Court’s reasoning for requiring 
bilateral arbitration turned on its determination that class arbitration, unlike 
                                                                                                                           
 76 This is not a product of laziness or lack of intellectual curiosity. It is quite difficult to eval-
uate the benefit of litigation. See Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 855, 897 
(2015) (noting difficulty of quantifying social benefits of litigation). 
 77 The studies also demonstrated, and the rulemakers seemed to accept, that discovery costs 
were high in only a small percentage of cases. Yet, the rulemakers still chose to amend the rules. 
One explanation for this response is that the rules are transsubstantive and have to address the 
most complex cases even when those cases are in the minority. A more cynical explanation is that 
the rulemaking process is captured by entities with a great interest in keeping the cost of these 
high-stakes cases down. Whatever the reason, however, the bottom line is that costs, even when 
accrued in a small number of cases, motivated the development of this procedural reform. 
 78 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 548–49 (2007). 
 79 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 80 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559. 
 81 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685–86. 
 82 AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–51 (2011). 
 83 This agreement was a contract of adhesion—a point on which all parties and the Court 
agreed. Id. at 1746, 1756; Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167DMS AJB, 2008 WL 
5216255, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008) (concluding contract was contract of adhesion and ap-
plying unconscionability test for adhesion contracts), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility 
L.L.C., 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740. 
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bilateral arbitration, was not efficient because it “sacrifices the principal 
advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the process slower, 
more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judg-
ment.”84 Class arbitration is generally governed by rules that are based on 
the federal class action rules.85 Thus, although bilateral arbitration offers 
refuge from the slow, costly morass that is our civil litigation system, class 
arbitration would not. 
In other words, the Court was worried that class arbitration would cost 
more, and thus, be less efficient. The Court did not consider the effect this 
decision would have on plaintiffs, however. The Court dismissed out of 
hand the unfairness of contracts of adhesion by noting, “the times in which 
consumer contracts were anything other than adhesive are long past.”86 In-
stead, the Court expressed concern about how the corporate defendants 
would be affected if they had to engage in class arbitration. The lack of 
meaningful appellate review in arbitration, the majority thought, would 
make class arbitration much too risky for businesses. After all, arbitration 
does not provide for de novo review because review “under § 10 focuses on 
misconduct [by the arbitration panel] rather than mistake.”87 The majority 
explained that given these limitations, “[a]rbitration is poorly suited to the 
higher stakes of class litigation.”88 Indeed, “[t]he point is that in class-action 
arbitration huge awards (with limited judicial review) will be entirely pre-
dictable.”89 This led the Court to conclude that “defendants would [not] bet 
the company” if class arbitration was an option for plaintiffs.90 In other 
words, to the extent class arbitration looked like civil litigation, defendants 
would not choose arbitration at all.91 The costs, under that type of a regime, 
would be too high. But, once again, the Court did not explicitly assess the 
                                                                                                                           
 84 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 1750. 
 87 Id. at 1752 (discussing section of the Federal Arbitration Act addressing grounds for vaca-
tion and rehearing codified in 9 U.S.C. § 10); see also Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 
(2012).  
 88 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752. 
 89 Id. at 1752 n.8. 
 90 Id. at 1752. 
 91 As already discussed, it is disputed whether the Court’s critique of the civil litigation sys-
tem is empirically supported or not. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased 
Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 77, 77 (1993) (demonstrating that many of the sta-
tistics and rhetoric criticizing civil litigation is inaccurate). The Concepcion dissent argued that the 
majority’s assertion that class arbitration was so complex that it would discourage arbitration 
altogether was unfounded. 131 S. Ct. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that the 
majority had no empirical support for its argument and that comparing class arbitration to bilateral 
arbitration was the wrong metric. Id. at 1760. A more accurate comparison—from the defendant’s 
perspective—would be to pit class arbitration against class action litigation. That comparison 
would show that class arbitration is preferable. Id. at 1759–60. 
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costs to the plaintiffs, and further, did not articulate what benefits might 
result from a system that permitted class arbitration.92 
Finally, Congress is equally attuned to this narrow definition of costs. 
For example, in 1996, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(“PLRA”).93 This legislation was intended to stem the tide of frivolous pris-
oner claims, which were arguably costing the federal court system too much 
in time and resources.94 Yet, according to some scholars, “[m]any of the 
provisions deter meritorious cases along with the frivolous, and might not 
save the federal courts any significant amount of time or money.”95 In other 
words, Congress did not appear to value the potential cost of losing merito-
rious claims. In addition, the media played a part in this legislation by fo-
cusing the public’s attention on extreme cases of frivolous litigation, some 
of which did not turn out to be so frivolous after all.96 Other congressional 
legislation regarding litigation has similarly focused on lowering litigation 
costs.97 Like the Court and federal rulemakers, Congress uses a cramped 
definition of cost when describing its efficiency analysis. 
                                                                                                                           
 92 The dissent arguably attempted to make this assessment. See 131 S. Ct. at 1759–61 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting). 
 93 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to 
1321-77 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C. tits. 11, 18, 28, 42 (2012)); Susan N. Herman, 
Slashing and Burning Prisoners’ Rights: Congress and the Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. 
REV. 1229, 1277 (1998). 
 94 See Herman, supra note 93, at 1277–78 (discussing the cost-cutting measures devised by 
Congress in the PLRA). 
 95 Id. at 1231; see also Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of Education, 90 VA. 
L. REV. 1693, 1704–05 (2004) (“The Prison Litigation Reform Act thus raised the cost of conduct-
ing successful prison reform litigation without changing the substantive law and, at the same time, 
reduced the resources available to prison reform litigators.”). 
 96 Jessica Feierman, Creative Prison Lawyering: From Silence to Democracy, 11 GEO. J. ON 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 249, 258–59 (2004) (“Moreover, much of the widely circulating infor-
mation about frivolous lawsuits—echoed both on the floor of Congress and in the media during 
the congressional debates on the [PLRA]—was exaggerated or even false. Individual stories were 
distorted or taken out of context.”). 
 97 See infra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing the Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005 (“CAFA”)). But see generally Changing the Rules: Will Limiting the Scope of Civil Discov-
ery Diminish Accountability and Leave Americans Without Access to Justice? Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Bankr. and the Courts of the U.S. Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 1–125 
(2013) [hereinafter Changing the Rules] (a hearing held by the Judiciary Committee to discuss the 
currently proposed amendment to the discovery rules). The Committee heard testimony from 
Sherrilyn Ifill, the President and Director-Counsel at NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
Inc., Arthur Miller, a Professor at New York University School of Law, and Andrew Pincus, a 
Partner at Mayer Brown LLP. Changing the Rules, supra, at 7–31, 41–78. Much of the focus of 
the hearing turned on discovery costs. See Congress Takes Up the Skyrocketing Cost of E-
discovery, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.instituteforlegal
reform.com/resource/congress-takes-up-skyrocketing-costs-of-e-discovery/ [http://perma.cc/UXW3-
DTNZ]; see also Changing the Rules, supra, at 39–40 (statement of Sen. John Cornyn) (arguing 
that technological advancements have outpaced federal civil rulemaking, resulting in increased 
costs). 
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2. Public Cost Consciousness 
Similar to the institutional actors described above, the media and the 
public have focused their attention on the simple cost of litigation. The fo-
cus is generally not in relation to other costs like the price of inaccurate re-
sults or the costs borne by plaintiffs. To the contrary, a narrow cost focus 
dominates. There are two types of media that appear in this realm. The first 
is popular media—articles and works focused on reaching a broader audi-
ence. The second is, for lack of a better term, lobbying media—articles and 
papers focused on persuading policy-makers that the cost of litigation needs 
to be addressed. 
As discussed in Part I, the media has focused its attention on litigation. 
The litigiousness of our nation has been a critical focus, but part of that cri-
tique is that litigation costs money. Lawyers are often blamed for this cost. 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers and the contingency fee arrangement, as well as the re-
jection (in most cases) of a loser-pay litigation system, are blamed for in-
centivizing bad lawyers to bring bad cases.98 Yet, even in cases where it is 
fairly apparent that there was some kind of wrong-doing, the media turns its 
focus from the wrong-doer to the bottom line: how much is litigation going 
to cost? For example, coverage of the British Petroleum (“BP”) oil spill liti-
gation has highlighted how much litigation is costing the public and even 
BP itself.99 The cost is often cast in terms of how it makes individuals’ lives 
worse; the cost of litigation is passed on to the consumer in some fashion.100 
                                                                                                                           
 98 See Paul H. Rubin, Opinion, More Money into Bad Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2010, 4:44 
PM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/11/15/investing-in-someone-elses-lawsuit/more-
money-into-bad-suits [http://perma.cc/99X7-CL8B] (arguing that third-party funding of litigation 
would mainly benefit lawyers, not society, and further arguing that lawyers are to blame for the 
country’s “litigious” nature). 
 99 See Associated Press, $15M Earmarked for Louisiana’s Gulf Oil Spill Litigation, NEW ORLE-
ANS CITY BUS. (July 18, 2014), http://neworleanscitybusiness.com/blog/2014/07/18/15m-earmarked-
for-la-s-gulf-oil-spill-litigation/ [http://perma.cc/PZK2-LMGT]; Sheila Shayon, BP Gets Burned in 
Ongoing Deepwater Horizon Litigation, BRAND CHANNEL (Mar. 4, 2014), http://www.brand
channel.com/home/post/2014/03/04/140304-BP-Deepwater-Horizon-Litigation.aspx [http://perma.cc
/AV8R-Q9WA]. The same was true in the mortgage crisis. See, e.g., E. Scott Reckard, Bank of 
America Earnings Tumble 43% on Mortgage Litigation Costs, L.A. TIMES (Jul. 16, 2014, 9:29 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-bank-america-earnings-20140716-story.html; David Reilly, 
Big-Bank Bar Tab Keeps Growing, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 18, 2014, 12:28 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
articles/big-bank-bar-tab-keeps-growing-heard-on-the-street-1405700901 [http://perma.cc/Z7H4-UY
2S]. 
 100 See, e.g., Sean Dow, A Case for Malpractice Reform, TIMES-NEWS (Aug. 4, 2014, 12:01 
AM), http://www.thetimesnews.com/opinion/opinion-columns/a-case-for-malpractice-reform-1.35
4490 [http://perma.cc/359K-7A7X] (arguing that malpractice claims cost consumers in the form of 
higher insurance rates and less access to medical care). 
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This ubiquitous cost-focus demonstrates the degree to which the media’s 
portrayal of litigation detracts from a discussion of litigation’s benefits.101 
In addition, organizations like the American Tort Reform Association 
(“ATRA”) have a pronounced impact on how legislators, and thus the pub-
lic, view litigation.102 Each year, ATRA releases a report called Judicial 
Hellholes, which ranks particular jurisdictions according to their relative 
friendliness to defendants.103 Similarly, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce has 
an Institute for Legal Reform, which publishes a report called the Lawsuit 
Climate Report.104 This report includes a survey of corporate general coun-
sels and defense attorneys, and asks them to assess each state on the basis of 
“how fair and reasonable the state’s tort liability system is perceived to be 
by U.S. businesses.”105 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce also prepares pa-
pers specifically aimed at highlighting the rising cost of litigation for corpo-
rations.106 
All of this work is disseminated to legislators and available to the pub-
lic, and it undoubtedly has an impact on how both perceive litigation. The 
negative rhetoric about lawsuits has been repeated so often that, even in the 
face of strong evidence to the contrary, the narrative lives on. As one schol-
ar observed: “The anti-lawsuit rhetorical messages were repeated over and 
over by business-funded institutes and Fortune 500 companies and are now 
omnipresent in popular culture.”107 
Much of that rhetoric focuses not just on the alleged frivolous nature 
of the claims, but also on the cost. For example, one Judicial Hellholes re-
port stated: “California’s addiction to lawsuits claims average residents as 
victims, too. The litigation system there effectively imposed a $33.5 billion 
hidden tax—or $883 per resident—just for the costs of lawsuits settled thus 
                                                                                                                           
 101 For example, some litigation benefits individuals and the public. See Arthur Bryant, What 
“Greedy” Trial Lawyers and “Frivolous” Litigation Do, ACSBLOG (July 22, 2014), http://www.acs
law.org/acsblog/what-“greedy”-trial-lawyers-and-“frivolous”-litigation-do [http://perma.cc/SR3E-3X
JQ]. 
 102 See About ATRA, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, http://www.atra.org/about [http://perma.cc/
XQH4-BL7F]. 
 103 See JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2013/2014, supra note 51, at 1–3 (identifying top six geograph-
ic areas where courts are perceived as unfair to defendants). 
 104 See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, LAWSUIT CLIMATE 1 (2012), http://www.
instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/Lawsuit_Climate_Report_2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/2F8T-
Z5FR]. 
 105 Id.  
 106 See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS OF LITI-
GATION COSTS: CANADA, EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE UNITED STATES (2013), http://www.institute
forlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/ILR_NERA_Study_International_Liability_Costs-update.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/5DG8-MSDX]. 
 107 Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Judicial Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates and Bad Social Science: 
Lessons from West Virginia, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (2008). 
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far in 2013 . . . .”108 Similarly, the report argued that litigation over certain 
consumer protection laws “only serves to make plaintiffs’ lawyers richer 
while it actually hurts consumers—especially disadvantaged consumers—as 
litigation costs are invariably passed on to them in the form of higher . . . 
prices.”109 Although these particular publications discuss state courts and 
state laws, the rhetoric is the same in response to federal courts. Litigation, 
in both cases, is evaluated on the basis of its “costs,” whether in terms of 
cost to the litigant itself or in terms of how that litigation cost is passed on 
to the public. What is missing from this coverage is a discussion of how 
litigants and the public might benefit from litigation and how much the loss 
of that benefit itself costs. 
III. AGAINST THE CURRENT EFFICIENCY NORM 
This Part of this Article argues against the efficiency norm as currently 
defined. Institutional actors’ fidelity to a particular conception of efficiency 
is highly problematic. First, section A analyzes how a cost-focused defini-
tion of efficiency misapprehends the real meaning of efficiency.110 It ac-
counts for efficiency in terms of simple, measurable costs, and does not 
value costs that are more difficult to quantify, nor give adequate weight to 
benefits. Second, section B analyzes how commitment to this version of 
efficiency has contributed to profound shifts in the underlying presumptions 
about civil litigation.111 These shifts have distorted the development of pro-
cedural doctrine. 
A. Ill-Defined Efficiency 
The focus on simple costs has resulted in an efficiency norm that too 
narrowly defines efficiency. This section argues that the definition of effi-
ciency incorrectly excludes a comprehensive set of costs that, although ad-
mittedly more difficult to quantify, are critical to an accurate measure of 
efficiency. 
1. An Incomplete Definition 
Many scholars may think it, but at least one scholar has stated that 
“[j]ust as war is too important to be left to generals, civil procedure . . . is 
too important to be left to proceduralists.” 112 Thus, this section begins with 
                                                                                                                           
 108 See JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2013/2014, supra note 51, at 7. 
 109 Id. at 8. 
 110 See infra notes 112–162 and accompanying text. 
 111 See infra notes 164–249 and accompanying text. 
 112 John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and 
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877 (1987) (discussing procedural 
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a brief overview of how efficiency has been defined elsewhere, specifically 
in law and economics literature. Although too vast to properly summarize, 
this section endeavors to provide a loose sense of the various concerns that 
animate the concept of efficiency. The goal is to first explain how these 
concerns are not addressed in the dominant definition of efficiency in pro-
cedure today and to second consider how some of these definitions might 
properly factor into a reclaimed efficiency definition. 
Esteemed law and economics scholars have worked to define efficien-
cy in a multitude of settings.113 There are various nuanced definitions of 
efficiency in the literature. For example, according to the Pareto theory, “[a] 
legal rule is efficient if it induces people to behave in such a way that no 
one can be made better off (in terms of [his or] her own preferences) with-
out making someone else worse off.”114 Under the Kaldor-Hicks approach, 
however, “efficiency is defined in terms of the aggregative benefits of an 
activity outweighing the aggregative costs.”115 Yet another approach—
social welfare maximization—would “deem[] actions or institutions ‘effi-
cient’ to the extent that they increase or improve ‘social welfare.’”116 In oth-
er words, there are variations in how efficiency can be defined. As one 
scholar noted, “[t]he term ‘efficiency’ has proven to be chameleon-like.”117 
Nonetheless, there is a generalized definition of efficiency upon which most 
law and economics scholars appear to agree. That is—at its most basic lev-
el—efficiency is “the relationship between the aggregate benefits of a situa-
tion and the aggregate costs of the situation.”118 
                                                                                                                           
scholars’ blind spot to law and economic concerns in the context of examining attorney-client 
relations in class actions). 
 113 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 3–16 (1982) (evaluating “claims that the goal of antitrust policy should be to 
promote efficient business behavior and explores the appropriate scope and inherent limitations of 
the efficiency goal” and summarizing various scholars’ efficiency definitions); Gary Lawson, 
Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53, 78–96 (1992) (reviewing five possible definitions 
of social efficiency). 
 114 Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 
U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 688–89 (1986). For a detailed account of the Pareto theory, see VILFREDO 
PARETO, COURS D’ECONOMIE POLITIQUE (G.H. Bousquet et al. eds., 1964); VILFREDO PARETO, 
MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Ann S. Schwier et al. eds., 1971). 
 115 Ora F. Harris, Jr., The Automobile Emissions Control Inspection and Maintenance Pro-
gram: Making It More Palatable to “Coerced” Participants, 49 LA. L. REV. 1315, 1345 n.157 
(1989). For a detailed account of the Kaldor-Hicks principle, see J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of 
Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics 
and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939). 
 116 Lawson, supra note 113, at 78. 
 117 Joseph Sanders, Road Signs and the Goals of Justice, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1297, 1297 n.4 
(1987) (reviewing Ideals, Beliefs, Attitudes, and the Law: Private Law Perspectives on a Public 
Law Problem by Guido Calabresi). 
 118 A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7–11 (4th ed. 
2011); see also Lawson, supra note 113, at 78 (stating that “[i]n its most straightforward sense, 
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Even this definition is fraught, however. How one measures “costs” 
and “benefits” necessarily turns on an evaluative judgment about what is a 
benefit and what is a cost. These measurements are inevitably subjective, 
and that means that reasonable people can disagree as into which catego-
ry—benefit or cost—to properly place the same thing.119 Nonetheless, the 
idea that efficiency is reached when the net benefits outweigh costs is, for 
the purposes of this Article, a fair statement of how law and economics 
scholars would most basically define the term. 
In contrast to the law and economics definition of efficiency, the dom-
inant definition of efficiency in the civil litigation context tends to focus 
solely on making one aspect of litigation cheaper, without regard to the oth-
er costs a particular change might create.120 This construction of costs does 
not include the necessary nuance and subjectivity. The cost focus is on the 
literal monetary cost of each litigation moment.121 One could assail this def-
inition as lazy, but that is arguably unfair.122 Although focusing on efficiency 
this way could be attributed to laziness, the more likely reason for assessing 
only raw costs is simplicity. In other words, the bare cost of each litigation 
moment is measurable, but measuring costs in a more nuanced fashion is 
harder and, as discussed below, may not be possible in every case. 
The measurability of cost is seen in every aspect of civil litigation. For 
example, most recently in the rulemaking context, the General Counsel of 
Microsoft presented a visual aid when testifying before the Civil Rules 
                                                                                                                           
efficiency refers to the ratio of outputs to inputs”). This Article does not engage in the develop-
ment of law and economics, and specifically the Chicago-style school of law and economics, as a 
field. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there is mounting literature criticizing the Chicago-style 
analysis of the concept of efficiency. See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 191, 191 (1980); Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 905, 905–06, 912 (1980); Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The 
Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197, 1197 
(1997). See generally James R. Hackney Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics, 
and the Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory, 15 LAW & HIST. REV. 275, 322 (1997) 
(arguing that the “revolution in tort law theory” spawned by neoclassical law and economics “has 
moved beyond the theoretical and on to policy”). 
 119 See Lawson, supra note 113, at 61–75 (discussing the subjective nature of valuing utility 
and goods). 
 120 See Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2073–74 
(2002) (evaluating claim that alternative dispute resolution is more efficient based on costs). 
 121 See Darryl K. Brown, The Perverse Effects of Efficiency in Criminal Process, 100 VA. L. 
REV. 183, 207–10 (2014). At least one scholar has made a similar observation in the criminal law 
context by pointing out that “efficiencies” obtained by adjudicating more cases at a quicker pace 
necessarily includes other undervalued costs. See id. This scholarship argues that “the public costs 
of criminal cases include much more than adjudication; most obviously, they include policing and 
investigation costs that precede charging, and the punishment expenditures that follow convic-
tion.” Id. at 208. 
 122 Whether it is politically motivated is another question. No doubt, there are powerful politi-
cal interests that work to affect the development of procedural doctrine. 
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Committee. A technicolor pyramid showed the amount of discoverable ma-
terials his company produced in litigation and was meant to concretely 
demonstrate how costly preservation of that material could be for his com-
pany.123 Similarly, at the Duke Civil Litigation Conference, the General 
Counsel of General Electric expressed concern over the amount of money 
his company spent on litigation, quoting an astronomical number for the 
audience.124 Finally, studies that quantify how much companies spend on 
litigation, and specifically discovery, abound. Recently, Senator Jon Kyl 
wrote an editorial in the Wall Street Journal to encourage corporate defend-
ants to participate in the civil rulemaking process, and he quoted these kinds 
of studies, pegging the cost of discovery in absolute numbers that look quite 
staggering.125 
This measure of cost does not just appear in civil rulemaking, however. 
It is also part of the Judiciary’s framing of efficiency. For example, in AT&T 
Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 
Twombly,126 as discussed in previous sections, the Supreme Court examined 
the procedural problems before it with reference to the simple “costs” of 
                                                                                                                           
 123 See Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Before Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, 79–81 (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.uscourts.
gov/file/9446/download [http://perma.cc/KV55-5CMN] [hereinafter January 2014 Public Hear-
ing]. Microsoft’s attorney David M. Howard stated: 
To put it another way, for each page that is actually used in evidence, we produce 
1,000 pages, review 4,000 pages, process 120,000 pages, and preserve over 670,000 
pages. Depending on the [type] of case, we spend 30 to 50 percent of our out-of-
pocket litigation dollars on discovery. In the last decade, we paid about $600 million 
in fees. 
Id. at 80. 
 124 See Alexander Dimitrief et al., Update on the Federal Rules Advisory Committee, 7 J.L. 
ECON. & POL’Y 211, 226–31 (2010) (edited transcript from the George Mason Judicial Education 
Program’s Fifth Annual Judicial Symposium on Civil Justice Issues, wherein General Electric’s 
General Counsel Alexander Dimitrief summarizes testimony delivered at Duke Civil Litigation 
Conference regarding corporations’ litigation expenses). A survey of thirty-six Fortune 200 com-
panies, conducted by the Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth, showed that 
“[a]s of 2008, the average respondent reported nearly $115 million total annual litigation costs 
(which exclude awards and settlements), having risen from $66 million in 2000.” LAWYERS FOR 
CIVIL JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GRP., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, LITIGA-
TION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES app. 1, at 7 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/
document/litigation-cost-survey-major-companies [http://perma.cc/9V9S-S6GP]. Among the thir-
ty-six survey respondents, “the total aggregate spen[t] on litigation in 2008 was $4.1 billion.” Id. 
at 4. 
 125 See Jon Kyl, A Rare Chance to Lower Litigation Costs, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 20, 2014, 6:21 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304049704579321003417505882 [http://per
ma.cc/R2ZM-WFYG]. 
 126 AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750–51 (2011); Ashcroft v. Iq-
bal, 556 U.S. 662, 686-87 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 548–49 (2007). 
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class actions and the simple “costs” of discovery.127 Congress is equally 
complicit in this framing of costs. In the run-up to the adoption of the Pri-
vate Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 
the record is replete with references to the cost of litigation. For example, 
Senator Pete Domenici complained that lawyers were garnering high fees 
from securities litigation, leaving the investor with little to show for the 
lawsuit.128 He argued that “[i]It is not worth the consequences to the enter-
prises being affected that normal litigation brings to the marketplace of 
American capitalism,” and called the resulting litigation system “eccentric” 
and full of “deep pocket lawsuits.”129 When discussing the PLRA, then-
Senator Bob Dole stated: “The National Association of Attorneys General 
estimates that inmate civil rights litigation costs the States more than $81 
million each year. Of course, most of these costs are incurred defending 
lawsuits that have no merit whatsoever.”130 He lamented that so many law-
suits were being filed “free of charge,” with “no court costs” and “no filing 
fees.”131 He argued, “This is outrageous and it must stop.”132 
Nonetheless, there are myriad problems with defining efficiency in 
terms of costs alone. First, there are costs that are not easily quantifiable. 
For example, what is the cost to society when the outcome of litigation is 
not accurate? Assuming the defendant won when it should not have, there 
are costs in terms of deterrence. That defendant and others like it will not be 
deterred from potentially harmful and otherwise costly behavior.133 The cost 
of that behavior is absorbed elsewhere, through higher insurance rates, indi-
vidual spending, and the like. Conversely, if the plaintiff wrongly prevails, 
there are also costs that are difficult to quantify. That litigation might spur 
other potential plaintiffs to engage in wasteful litigation, and the defendant 
will pay those extra costs or pass them on to consumers. Moreover, if litiga-
tion is perceived to be inaccurate—even assuming it most often reaches accu-
rate results—there is a cost. To the extent society lacks faith in the civil jus-
tice system, then parties may take their litigation elsewhere (at an arguable 
cost) or they may refrain from litigating at all (again at a cost, assuming, for 
                                                                                                                           
 127 See supra notes 79–85 and accompanying text (discussing the focus on discovery and class 
action costs in recent Supreme Court decisions). 
 128 141 CONG. REC. 35,302–03 (1995) (statement of Sen. Domenici). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 26,548 (statement of Sen. Dole). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination 
Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 430–31 (1999) (noting that in the employment discrimination 
context, “[g]eneral deterrence more effectively induces compliance with the law than specific 
deterrence [because] it reaches a broad class of potential offenders [and] [i]t also creates spill-over 
effects: punishment of one violation has a generalized deterrent effect on other, related viola-
tions”). 
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example, that the litigation would have had a beneficial deterrent effect).134 
As discussed in greater detail in Part IV, institutional actors often do not 
even endeavor to quantify these costs, rendering the working definition of 
efficiency incomplete.135 
The current efficiency norm is not only problematic because it fails to 
measure costs in a nuanced fashion. It also creates opportunities for mis-
guided decision-making because institutional actors may cherry-pick num-
bers without engaging in a rigorous cost-benefit analysis. For example, the 
proposed discovery amendments, most notably the requirement that discov-
ery be “proportional,”136 have sparked a debate about how much discovery 
really costs. The Civil Rules Committee has studied empirical data,137 heard 
from literally thousands of plaintiffs and defense attorneys,138 and met nu-
merous times to discuss this controversial proposal.139 Yet, many scholars 
have argued that the data used by the Committee was inaccurate, or in the 
very least incomplete. One scholar has argued that “[d]ecades of empirical 
work . . . support[] the view that the federal civil system is highly effective 
in most cases, that total costs develop in line with stakes, and that discovery 
volume and cost is proportional to the amount at stake.”140 Like the litiga-
                                                                                                                           
 134 The tension between these two conceptions of justice was articulated by Jeremy Bentham 
as real justice and apparent justice. See JEREMY BENTHAM, Principles of Judicial Procedure, in 2 
THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 21 (John Bowring ed., 5th ed. 1843). He wrote: 
That a system of procedure be good—that it be well adapted to its proper end, it is 
not sufficient that the decisions rendered in virtue of it be conformable to real jus-
tice; it is necessary that they should be conformable to apparent justice: to produce 
real justice, the only true way is to produce that which shall in the eye of public 
opinion be apparent justice. In point of utility, apparent justice is everything; real 
justice, abstractly from apparent justice, is a useless abstraction, not worth pursuing, 
and supposing it contrary to apparent justice, such as ought not to be pursued. 
Id. 
 135 See infra notes 250–272 and accompanying text (arguing that courts and professional legal 
organizations should do more to take into account non-monetary litgation costs). 
 136 U.S. COURTS, COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE–MAY 2014, at 63–
76 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standing/
ST2014-05.pdf#pagemode=bookmarks [http://perma.cc/L9HG-KR4H] [hereinafter 2014 COMM. 
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE] (enclosing Memorandum from the Honorable David 
G. Campbell, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to the Honorable Jeffery S. Sutton, Chair of the 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, discussing “proportionality”). 
 137 Id. at 65–67. 
 138 Approximately 2300 public comments were submitted and 120 witnesses testified in re-
sponse to the most recent Civil Rules package. See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LITIG., PRELIMI-
NARY REPORT ON COMMENTS ON PROPOSED CHANGES TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
2 (2014), http://www.cclfirm.com/files/Report_050914.pdf [http://perma.cc/4FZS-TYPU]. 
 139 See 2014 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 136, at 63 (noting 
that multiple hearings were held regarding proposals). 
 140 Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies 
and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1089 (2012). 
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tion explosion narratives discussed in Part I,141 the actual data runs counter 
to the narrative underlying the current definition of efficiency that institu-
tional actors employ. 
Moreover, beyond the use of incomplete efficiency data, another in-
herent risk in how institutional actors quantify cost in the efficiency norm is 
their dependence on anecdotal evidence. For example, the Twombly Court 
contended that discovery costs in the antitrust context were unusually 
high.142 Although this may in fact be the case, much of the evidence cited 
was anecdotal at best. The Court cited a New York University Law Review 
student note to support its assertions regarding discovery costs.143 Yet, that 
note admitted that it relied on “[a]necdotal evidence suggest[ing] that de-
fendants unable to shift the costs of complying with requests for electronic 
documents [in antitrust] . . . [felt] pressured to settle lawsuits to avoid the 
discovery costs.”144  
Similarly, when the Civil Rules Committee decided whether to elimi-
nate Rule 26(b)(1)’s subject matter expansion of relevance, the Committee 
members made the initial decision to do so by asking themselves—and only 
themselves—whether they had ever seen that provision used in practice. 
Having answered in the negative, the Committee moved forward with the 
change.145 This change was not expressly related to quantifying cost, but it 
is an example of how the Committee can fall victim to relying on anecdotal 
evidence, as opposed to a more nuanced analysis, when making changes to 
procedural doctrine. 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See supra notes 22–59 and accompanying text (discussing public and media outcry regard-
ing the alleged litgation explosion). 
 142 See 550 U.S. at 558. 
 143 Id. (citing William H. Wagener, Note, Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting on 
Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1887, 1898–99 (2003)). 
 144 Wagener, supra note 143, at 1898. The Court also cited a Memorandum from Paul V. 
Niemeyer, Chair of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to the Honorable Anthony J. Scirica, 
Chair of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, dated May 11, 1999. Twombley, 550 
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than simply expensive. See infra notes 150–155 and accompanying text (discussing studies evalu-
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 145 See January 2014 Public Hearing, supra note 123, at 132. Judge David G. Campbell stat-
ed: 
One of the things I think we discussed on the Committee in eliminating the subject 
matter reference was that nobody on the Committee, as I recalled when we dis-
cussed it, lawyer or judge, had ever heard anybody request a good cause extension 
to subject matter. Everything was focused on relevancy. And that seemed to be the 
arena in which all of the discovery decisions were made. 
Id. 
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The final danger of this simplified cost-focus is that it puts a thumb on 
the scale in favor of institutional actors’ own experiences. The data is so 
one-note that actors cannot help but rely on their own experience with civil 
litigation when making policy decisions. Yet, Congress, rulemakers, and the 
judiciary are dominated by largely elite actors.146 As one scholar has argued, 
the “elite” institutional actors “tend to have a limited and spotty grasp of 
what the bulk of the legal system is really like.”147 They identify things like 
discovery abuse, which occur in a relatively small number of cases, as a 
“general problem[]” that must be fixed on a systemic level.148 In effect, the 
debate is being shaped by a small group of individuals with very specific 
experiences and perspectives on what is efficient. Further, these individuals 
are more likely to be influenced by corporate interests by virtue of those 
entities’ ability to gain access to them. This means that there is a tendency 
to frame costs in a self-serving, but not necessarily accurate, way. 
Because costs are so critical to accurately assessing efficiency, when 
costs are not accurately quantified, efficiency becomes a less meaningful 
term. Accordingly, the next section addresses how, in addition to ill-
conceived “costs,” the efficiencies allegedly obtained under the current effi-
ciency norm might also be problematic. 
2. Efficiencies—No Matter How Defined—May Not Be Obtained 
If efficiency is ill-defined for the reasons described above, that inaccu-
racy may still be tolerable if the changes being made in the name of effi-
ciency are actually making the civil litigation system better. The question is 
how to make that assessment, especially because there is not yet a fully 
functional term for efficiency.149 This section argues that the changes are not 
working. First, it is unlikely, or at least unknown, whether these changes are 
                                                                                                                           
 146 Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil Rule-
making, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 278–86 (2009) (discussing how the rulemaking agenda has been set 
by an elite subset of the lawyer population); see also Carl Tobias, Diversity on the Federal Bench, 
87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1197, 1197–98 (2010) (“Minorities and women have long been underrepre-
sented on the bench. Caucasians constitute 84 percent of lower court judges. . . . A female judge 
has never served on 12 of the 94 districts, while people of color have yet to be jurists in even more 
districts.” (footnotes omitted)); Erin Banco, Report Says Congress Is More Diverse and More 
Divided, N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS (July 9, 2013, 4:57 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/
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(finding that even though Congress currently has a record number of women and racial minorities, 
it is still a predominantly white, male institution). 
 147 Galanter, supra note 44, at 61; see also Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 
1909 (1989) (stating that businesses’ concerns about judicial caseloads are a “weapon of percep-
tion, not substance”). 
 148 Galanter, supra note 44, at 61. 
 149 See infra notes 250–272 and accompanying text.  
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actually lowering costs. For example, these changes may simply shift the 
money that might have been spent on trial to other costly procedural mo-
ments like discovery and summary judgment. Second, in a redefined con-
cept of efficiency, even assuming that raw costs are lowered, the unknown 
costs to other parts of the system prevent an accurate assessment of whether 
the current efficiency norm is making the system more efficient. 
The first question is whether the shifting civil litigation norms are ac-
tually making litigation cheaper. On that count, existing data point in multi-
ple directions. As discussed above, studies demonstrate that discovery, in 
the run of cases, is not that expensive. Median costs of $15,000–$20,000, 
with increases that appear to directly relate to the stakes in the case, seem 
reasonable.150 Notwithstanding, other studies show that in these high-stakes 
cases, the discovery costs can be quite substantial. In one study by the 
RAND Institute for Civil Justice, the median discovery costs were $1.8 mil-
lion.151 Yet this study looked at only eight “very large corporations” for its 
data and reviewed only forty-five cases.152 Another 2010 study surveyed 
Fortune 200 companies and found that 2006–2008 discovery costs ranged 
from $620,000 to $3 million per case.153 It is certainly true that these num-
bers—on their face—seem substantial. But the study ignores a couple of 
important contextualizing statistics. The median revenue of Fortune 200 
companies in 2011 was $25 billion.154 Thus, even assuming that the average 
cost of discovery in each case is $2.5 million (an estimate that runs on the 
high end), this is only 0.01% of those companies’ median revenues. Alt-
hough the numbers are large, these studies demonstrate that high stakes cas-
es result in higher costs. Moreover, they reveal that discussing the cost of 
litigation without contextualizing the wherewithal of each litigant is mis-
leading.155 
Thus, these discovery studies cannot tell us everything we need to 
know. Unfortunately, studies outside of the discovery context are even more 
limited. For example, if the trial is vanishing, in part, because of higher 
rates of summary judgment, is that saving the system money? In 1983, a 
group of scholars studied “ordinary cases” and determined that trials ac-
                                                                                                                           
 150 See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 151 NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, WHERE THE 
MONEY GOES: UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC DISCOV-
ERY 17 (2012), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1208.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/6XKR-M3BH]. 
 152 Id. at 7, 17. 
 153 Kyl, supra note 125 (discussing discovery cost survey). 
 154 Largest U.S. Corporations, FORTUNE, May 23, 2011, at F-28. 
 155 See Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1938 
(2009) (stating that “over the course of its existence, despite the revolution worked by [the discov-
ery scheme], [it] has seen very little in the way of systematic empirical study”). 
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counted for less than ten percent of the time lawyers spent on cases.156 This 
was in stark contrast to motion practice and discovery, which other scholars 
found had a much greater impact on the amount of time lawyers spent liti-
gating a case.157 This seems to indicate that the loss of the trial is not saving 
us much. This study is old, however, and little work has been done since to 
quantify the costs of having a trial or not.158 As for the efficiency gains of 
summary judgment, we simply do not know if there are any—partly be-
cause the studies have not been done, but also because it seems impossible 
to structure a study that could capture that data.159 
Because the data on the cost of litigation is limited, controversial, and, 
in some cases, incomplete, that leaves scholars to assess whether the shifts 
in civil litigation norms have lowered costs by using anecdotal evidence, or 
“anec-data.” As stated earlier, anecdotal evidence is a poor substitute for 
accurate empirical work, but in the absence of empirical data, it may be all 
we have. Even with regard to anecdotal evidence, however, there is little 
agreement. Some judges argue that procedural innovations like summary 
judgment motions have created greater cost. One judge stated that: “The 
time spent on summary judgment motions in my chambers has ballooned 
over my eighteen years of service. It is far and away the most time-intensive 
activity of any chambers’ function. It has become the large bulge in the py-
thon.”160 Yet, other judges have reported that they spend too much time on 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 80–
85 (1983). Trubek looked at 1649 state and federal civil lawsuits from five judicial districts. Id. 
The study excluded disputes where the initial claim was less than $1000, as well as thirty-seven 
“megacases.” Id. 
 157 Id. at 104. 
 158 See D. Theodore Rave, Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 875, 890 (2006) (“The available empirical data are insufficient to answer the question of 
whether summary judgment is efficient.”). 
 159 See Clermont, supra note 155, at 1941 (“Despite summary judgment’s importance, our 
knowledge of its workings has always been scanty.”); Brooke D. Coleman, Summary Judgment: 
What We Think We Know Versus What We Ought to Know, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 705, 706 (2012) 
(summarizing the summary judgment studies done to date, arguing that “a key inquiry is missing: 
a systematic study of what is happening in summary judgment on the ground,” and further arguing 
that using “existing [empirical] work to make principled arguments about the pros and cons of 
summary judgment will always fall short”). 
 160 Mark W. Bennett, From the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary Judgment” Days 
of Employment Discrimination to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affirmed Without Com-
ment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 685, 704 (2013). 
Judge Bennett wrote: 
Virtually none of the legal academy’s writing on the subject of the state of summary 
judgment, or the empirical research on the subject, ever touch on the enormous bur-
den the expanded summary judgment industry places on federal district court judges 
and the inevitable adverse consequences on our other work. Judge Hornby insight-
fully observes that “judges and magistrate judges must be careful that their cham-
bers’ investment of substantial time and energy assessing motions does not sublimi-
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discovery and that they find it wasteful.161 To counter this, studies have 
shown that most lawyers and judges anecdotally believe that discovery is 
proportional.162 In other words, like the empirical work that has been done 
to date, the anecdotal evidence is equally indeterminate. Whether costs are 
actually going down as a consequence of the current efficiency norm is un-
known. 
Nonetheless, even assuming that costs have gone down because of the 
efficiency norm, the current efficiency definition still falls short. This is be-
cause the definition does not accurately reflect the benefits of civil litiga-
tion, nor does it account for costs outside of raw process costs. To put a fin-
er point on it, efficiency as currently defined does not include the benefits 
of successful litigation, the costs of inaccurate results, and the systemic de-
ficiencies of a system that no longer provides a public forum. Part IV of this 
Article further explores these missing parts of the definition of efficiency.163 
B. Shifting Litigation Presumptions 
This section discusses how the existing efficiency norm has contribut-
ed to two shifts in presumptions about how the civil litigation system func-
tions: the shift from trial to “not trial” and from plaintiff receptivity to plain-
tiff skepticism. Different institutional actors have validated each of these 
shifts. These shifts have been justified in part by the efficiency norm;164 fur-
ther, these shifts have profoundly changed the civil litigation system. 
Scholars, including Rick Marcus and Ben Spencer, have observed that 
the “ethos” that informs the development of procedural doctrine has shifted 
from a liberal to a restrictive one.165 This Article does not challenge that 
claim. Different from observing and naming a shift in the ethos of proce-
dural doctrine, however, this Article argues that the efficiency norm has of-
ten been used to justify a shift in how institutional actors believe that the 
system should work. In other words, scholars have accurately assessed a 
symptom of the efficiency norm without fully diagnosing the origin of that 
symptom. It is the efficiency norm that is partly responsible for motivating 
                                                                                                                           
nally counsel granting them so as to justify the investment.” In my experience, in 
nine out of ten cases, it would be less time-consuming to try the case to a jury than 
rule on the bulge in the python. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 161 2014 ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 69. 
 162 Id. 
 163 See infra notes 250–272 and accompanying text. 
 164 The Article is not arguing that the efficiency norm is the sole cause of these shifts. Con-
cerns about accuracy, certainty, increased activity in the court system, and the politicization of the 
civil litigation system—to name just a few—contribute to these shifts as well. So although the 
efficiency norm is a critical part of the causation for these shifts, it is not entirely responsible. 
 165 See Marcus, Confessions, supra note 12, at 109. 
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institutional actors to shift their presumptions about how the civil litigation 
system should work because they believe those presumptions result in 
greater efficiency. Yet, as argued in the previous section, the efficiency def-
inition relied upon is deeply flawed. This section argues further that the 
shifts in presumptions that the efficiency norm has created are similarly 
questionable. 
1. From Trial to Not Trial 
The first shifting presumption is from the presumption that a merits-
based trial is the goal to a presumption that a non-trial exit is the norm. As 
this section demonstrates, rulemakers, legislators, and judges make deci-
sions reflective of the idea that that trial is no longer the ultimate endgame 
in civil litigation. 
As discussed in the previous section, from 1962 to 2004, the total 
number of civil cases terminated increased by 400%, but the number of tri-
als fell by 32%.166 In other words, there are a lot more cases and they are 
terminating in high numbers, but they are not being resolved through trial. 
Exactly what is happening in these cases is harder to determine than one 
might anticipate, however. For example, data captured by the Administra-
tive Office of the Courts tracks the number of terminated cases by catego-
ries,167 but the categories do not shed much light on exactly how the cases 
are resolving.168 The numbers provide information regarding timing, but 
leave open the question of exactly how the cases end.  
Some scholars have argued that settlement is the primary mode of res-
olution.169 The problem is that there is no specific information about settle-
ment rates—there are only estimates. For example, settlement rates are of-
ten pegged at 85–95%.170 Others have set the rate a bit lower and question 
                                                                                                                           
 166 Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 7, 7–8; see supra notes 22–
58 and accompanying text (discussing the declining annual number of civil trials since 1938, when 
the Federal Rules were adopted). 
 167 See TABLE C-4, supra note 26, at 1. The court statistics categorize the cases as follows: (i) 
those that terminated with “no court action,” so presumably either by voluntary dismissal, alterna-
tive dispute resolution, or settlement; (ii) those terminated “before pretrial,” meaning before any 
dispositive motions have been filed before the court; and (iii) those terminated “during or after 
pretrial,” meaning cases terminated during or after a dispositive motion like summary judgment 
has been filed. In 2014, those absolute numbers were (i) 53,771, (ii) 175,990, and (iii) 27,397, 
respectively. 
 168 Galanter, supra note 166, at 7 n.1 (noting government records track cases terminated “dur-
ing or after trial” instead of more precisely identifying when and how cases terminated). 
 169 Glover, supra note 13, at 1725 (“Normative disagreements [about the value of settlement] 
aside, however, scholars agree on one thing: Settlement is here to stay.”). 
 170 Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotions and Regulation of 
Settlement, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339–40 (1994). 
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the way settlement is defined.171 The bottom line is, however, that most cas-
es settle. 
What all of these statistics demonstrate is that trials have indeed de-
creased over the last forty years. Whether settlement has increased or held 
steady is harder to tell because the data are inexact.172 It is worth noting, 
however, that even when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopt-
ed, trial rates were not high. Even when trials were thought to be the norm, 
the rate of actual trials ranged from 12–20%.173 Although the rate of trials 
has decreased, stating that it has decreased without valuing that decrease 
risks overstating the metric. It is important to appreciate this point when 
debating what the systemic presumptions should be; even when the pre-
sumption is trial, that does not necessarily mean that a high percentage of 
cases will culminate in that result. The prevailing presumption in the early 
years of the Civil Rules was that the parties prepared the case for resolution 
on the merits, whether through trial or otherwise. In contrast, the current 
presumption is that the parties will prepare the case for early resolution 
without resort to trial. Thus, preparation for adjudication on the merits is no 
longer a guiding principle. 
a. Helicopter-Judging 
How courts adjudicate cases provides the primary example of how the 
norms undergirding the civil litigation system have shifted from a concern 
with resolving cases on the merits to a concern with resolving cases—
period. As discussed, statistics tell us that even in the 1940s, not all cases 
were resolved through trial.174 Nevertheless, the attitude was that the pur-
pose of the civil litigation process was to narrow down issues for trial. The 
goal was to weed out issues that were not triable before a jury, and to adju-
dicate the remaining issues as necessary. The judge was largely left out of 
                                                                                                                           
 171 Id. The term “settlement” can communicate the idea that the parties, on their own, arrive at 
terms of settlement. Yet most cases settle as a result of negotiations after a court has decided a 
dispositive motion or part of a deal reached through alternative dispute resolution. Id. at 1340–41. 
In other words, settlement occurs as part of the adjudicative system, and it is misleading to say 
that settlement happens in “most cases” without pointing out that many of those cases interact to 
some degree with the civil litigation system at large. Id.; see also John Barkai & Elizabeth Kent, 
Let’s Stop Spreading Rumors About Settlement and Litigation: A Comparative Study of Settlement 
and Litigation in Hawaii Courts, 29 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 85, 109 (2014) (arguing that 
settlement rates are chronically overstated and finding, based on the authors’ own empirical data, 
that “88% of tort cases, 54% of contract cases, 55% of ‘other,’ and 70% of ‘all’ cases settled” in 
2007). 
 172 See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 170, at 1339–40 (discussing settlement rate estimates). 
 173 See supra notes 22–59 and accompanying text (discussing historical trial rate estimates). 
 174 See supra notes 22–59 and accompanying text (discussing historical trial rate estimates). 
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the process until the moment at which he or she was needed to address 
those remaining meritorious issues. 
Today’s world is different. Instead of intervening only to reach the 
merits, judges are engaged in the litigation process from the start. They are 
expected to “manage” the cases, and moreover, they are expected to push 
the cases toward a non-trial exit. They are—in modern terms—helicopter-
judging.175 This shift in the norm about what civil litigation’s endgame 
should be is demonstrated in myriad ways by the judges themselves and the 
rules they abide by. 
For example, as Professor Judith Resnik argued in her seminal article 
Managerial Judges, during the late 1960s to early 1970s, the role of federal 
judge began to shift. 176 Because of higher workloads and a sense that judg-
es were not doing enough, as well as the “litigation explosion” already dis-
cussed, judges began to respond by developing procedures for adjudicating 
cases more quickly.177 Congress also engaged by creating the Federal Judi-
cial Center, which was tasked with teaching judges how to better manage 
their cases.178 The attitudes toward judging began to change, and the focus, 
more and more, became trying to figure out how to move cases efficiently 
through the system. 
The origin of this focus on management can be traced to the tension 
created by discovery.179 When the Rules were adopted in 1938, they set up 
system that “embodied contradictory mandates.”180 On the one hand, the 
discovery rules required a lawyer to hand over relevant information, but on 
the other hand, the adversarial system required the lawyer to represent cli-
ents zealously.181 This tension led to a necessity of judicial refereeing.182 
Judges needed to be more engaged in order to resolve and “manage” dis-
covery disputes.183 Once engaged, the floodgates opened, and the judges 
became more and more involved in every step of the litigation process. 
                                                                                                                           
 175 This term is a riff on the term “helicopter-parenting.” Merriam-Webster defines a helicop-
ter parent as one “who is overly involved in the life of his or her child.” Helicopter Parent, MER-
RIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/helicopter%20parent [http://perma.
cc/67MN-VTZX]. 
 176 Resnik, supra note 42, at 378, 379–99 (arguing judges have an increasingly managerial 
role in litigation). But see E. Donald Elliot, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 307–08 (1986) (generally arguing that managerial judging is a good re-
sult, given the nature of the procedural regime). 
 177 Resnik, supra note 42, at 398. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. at 378. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. at 378–79. 
 183 Id. 
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The Civil Rules have followed suit and further expanded this phenom-
enon. The Rules—specifically the discovery rules—reflect this sense that 
judges should be more engaged in the nitty-gritty of litigation.184 When the 
Rules were adopted, discovery was viewed as an activity that took place 
largely outside the purview of the courts. But, as an Advisory Committee 
note explained in 1983, “[t]he rule contemplates greater judicial involve-
ment in the discovery process and thus acknowledges the reality that it can-
not always operate on a self-regulating basis.”185 The Advisory Committee 
note to the current discovery rules states that “the amendment again reflects 
the need for continuing and close judicial involvement in the cases that do 
not yield readily to the ideal of effective party management.” 186 The note 
explained that party management was preferred, but argued that “there will 
be important occasions for judicial management, both when the parties are 
legitimately unable to resolve important differences and when the parties 
fall short of effective, cooperative management on their own.”187 
This intense focus has led judges to become more engaged in encour-
aging parties to find non-trial exits from the litigation. Just as judges were 
not historically expected to develop cases, but now are, they were also not 
expected to settle cases, but now are.188 Pushing cases toward settlement 
used to be taboo. One court explained that were a judge to “persist at set-
tlement efforts and then hear the case and render judgment,” it would “inev-
itably raise[] . . . suspicion as to the fairness of the court’s administration of 
                                                                                                                           
 184 Id. at 391 (arguing that managerial judging is the result of both “(1) changes in the role of 
judges necessitated by procedural innovations and the articulation of new rights and remedies” 
and “(2) changes initiated by judges themselves in response to work load pressures”). 
 185 2014 ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 69, at 102. 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. Other Civil Rules similarly provide as much. Rule 16, for example, was amended in 
1983 to require the judge to issue a scheduling order. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s 
note to 1983 amendment, subdivision (b): Scheduling and Planning. According to the Advisory 
Committee’s note, this “mandatory scheduling order encourages the court to become involved in 
case management early in the litigation.” Id. Instead of waiting for the parties to bring their dis-
pute to the judge, Rule 16 requires the judge to engage from the outset. See id. r. 16(b) (requiring 
presiding judge to issue a scheduling order). Rule 16 also created the option for a scheduling con-
ference where the judge could meet with the parties early in the litigation. See id. r. 16 advisory 
committee’s note to 1983 amendment, subdivision (b): Scheduling and Planning. By all accounts, 
this conference option has been used to different degrees by judges, but many lawyers report that 
they are regularly required to appear before judges under Rule 16. These early “management” 
meetings invest the judges in overseeing the entire case and not just adjudicating the narrowed-
down merits disputes. In fact, summary judgment may be next for the “case management revolu-
tion.” See Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, Managing Summary Judgment, 43 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 517, 519–20 (2012) (arguing that the same judicial management ethos seen in Rules 16 and 
26 should be imported into summary judgment). 
 188 Resnik, supra note 42, at 384–85 (noting judges previously had limited roles in efforts to 
settle cases). 
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justice.”189 This tended to be the view of most judges until the last forty or 
so years. Now, settlement, alternative dispute resolution, and the like are the 
watchwords. As one judge stated: “[M]y goal is to settle all my cases . . .  
Most of the time when I try a case I consider that I have somehow failed the 
lawyers and the litigants.”190 Another judge observed that the volume of 
cases and pressure to avoid trial has led “some judges [to] do almost any-
thing to avoid deciding a case on the merits and find some procedural rea-
son to get rid of it, coerce the parties into settling or whatever it might 
be.”191 In fact, in many districts, by local rule, judges are required to funnel 
parties into some form of alternative dispute resolution, believing that the 
issues will be resolved or otherwise settled as a consequence.192 
All of this means that the presumptions about a judge’s role have 
switched from one focused on deciding issues when parties requested the 
intervention to one focused on shepherding the case to its end. This end is 
no longer presumed to be resolution on the merits and preparation for trial, 
but is instead presumed to be a non-trial exit. To be sure, there are excep-
tions to this trend,193 but they are just that—exceptions. 
                                                                                                                           
 189 Id. at 385 & n.52 (quoting Krattenstein v. G. Fox & Co., 236 A.2d 466, 469 (Conn. 1967)). 
 190 David Neubauer, Judicial Role and Case Management, 4 JUST. SYS. J. 223, 228 (1978) 
(quoting a conversation the author had with Fred J. Cassibry, Federal District Court Judge in the 
Eastern District of Louisiana from 1966 to 1987). 
 191 Judge Richard Arnold, Mr. Justice Brennan and the Little Case, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
663, 670 (1999). Judge Richard Arnold goes on to state: 
I wish that judges, instead of worrying about how to get rid of a case without decid-
ing it on the merits, would just sit down, pick up the next case, and decide it, and not 
worry so much about the other 500 cases that are sitting on their desk. You can do 
only one thing at a time. And if when you’re doing that one thing, your mind is on 
the next thing, you’re not going to do it very well. 
Id. 
 192 See, e.g., Jonathan D. Asher, Focus on Fairness: When Low-Income Consumers Face 
Court-Mandated ADR, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 119, 119 (1996) (finding that 
“[m]ore and more frequently, alternative dispute resolution is being mandated by judges and judi-
cial systems as a prerequisite to trial”); Judith Resnik, Mediating Preferences: Litigant Prefer-
ences for Process and Judicial Preferences for Settlement, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 155, 156–57 
(stating that although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instruct judges to “explore settlement 
as well as the use of alternative forms of dispute resolution” at pre-trial conferences, “[s]ome local 
district rules go yet further”; “[f]or example, in the federal trial courts in Massachusetts, a judge is 
required to raise the topic of settlement at every conference held with attorneys”); Thomas D. 
Rowe, Jr., Authorized Managerialism Under the Federal Rules—And the Extent of Convergence 
with Civil-Law Judging, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 191, 209 (2007) (stating that Federal Rule 16(c) gives 
judges the discretion to “take appropriate action with respect to . . . settlement . . . when authorized 
by statute or local rule,” although other federal law requires that each district court “authorize, by 
local rule . . . the use of alternative dispute resolution processes in all civil actions . . . to encour-
age and promote the use of alternative dispute resolution” (citations omitted)). 
 193 See Bennett, supra note 160, at 716–17 (arguing that summary judgment should be elimi-
nated, in part, so that cases can be tried). 
2015] The Efficiency Norm 1811 
b. Putting Procedural Pieces Together 
Federal procedure is constructed by the federal civil rulemaking pro-
cess, the federal courts, and Congress. By looking at how these institutions 
have approached procedural doctrine over the past approximately eighty 
years, one can see how the presumptions regarding trial have shifted. 
This shift in the presumption about how civil litigation resolves is 
starkly reflected in how federal civil rulemaking has changed between 1938 
and today. The original rulemakers had a distinct vision of how litigation 
would progress.194 That vision presumed that trial was the ultimate goal of 
the civil litigation system. Today, that vision is very different; resolution of 
cases is the goal, but trial is certainly not the chosen method. 
When the Rules Enabling Act was adopted in 1934, the U.S. Supreme 
Court appointed a body of academics and practitioners as an Advisory 
Committee to draft a body of federal procedural rules.195 That body worked 
together for four years and, in 1938, produced the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. They did not do this work on a clean slate, however. Many of 
the rulemakers had distinct viewpoints about how civil litigation would best 
function based on their own experience and study.196 
For example, an academic member of the Committee argued for a dis-
covery system that would allow the parties to freely exchange infor-
mation.197 This exchange was intended to allow the parties to more easily 
resolve their claims and to focus the parties on what merits issues needed to 
be resolved. The original Rule 26 allowed for the discovery of all relevant 
information related to the subject matter of the litigation. The Advisory 
Committee note to the original Rule 26 stated, “While the old chancery 
practice limited discovery to facts supporting the case of the party seeking 
                                                                                                                           
 194 At least the academic members of the Committee had this vision. Id. It is difficult to know 
how the attorneys on the Committee viewed the system, as they did not leave as abundant of a 
record of their viewpoints behind. 
 195 Bone, supra note 64, at 894 (discussing the early history of Federal Rules). 
 196 For example, Charles Clark, the noted “father of civil procedure,” believed that both the 
writ system and code pleading had failed. See Clark, supra note 63, at 43–68. These systems, he 
thought, focused too much on technical requirements of moving a case through the system and not 
enough on resolving the merits. See id. at 50–51. Thus, Clark advocated for a pleading regime that 
did not require the technical pleading of ultimate or evidentiary facts. See id. at 52–53. The Com-
mittee chose instead to adopt the current Rule 8, which on its face requires the plaintiff to state 
only a claim showing that he or she is entitled to relief. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a plain-
tiff to provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief”). This “notice” pleading regime was intended to focus the case on its merits and to propel 
cases more efficiently toward resolution. 
 197 See Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 
1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 710 (1998); Edson R. Sunderland, The Theo-
ry and Practice of Pretrial Procedure, 36 MICH. L. REV. 215, 216–19 (1937). 
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it, this limitation has been largely abandoned by modern legislation.”198 
Thus, the Committee rejected limitations on discovery and drafted a broad 
rule that would allow each party to obtain the information they needed to go 
to trial.199 Access to discovery was limited only by objections of attorney-
client privilege and relevance.200 
Finally, although the original Rules provided that claims could be elimi-
nated by judicial intervention pre-trial, those opportunities were limited. 
Namely, the Rules provided for a pre-trial motion to dismiss and a motion for 
summary judgment. Yet it cannot be overstated that the original Committee 
viewed these motions as ones meant to capture truly frivolous claims.201 If a 
claim potentially had merit, the Committee envisioned that claim making it to 
trial.202 
In terms of the default endgame, the rulemakers were certainly bullish 
about the opportunity for trial. Thus, they designed a procedural system that 
facilitated that end to the degree possible. The rulemakers did not believe 
that all cases would reach trial, however. As already discussed, even the 
highest of trial statistics from that era shows that, at most, twenty percent of 
cases were going to trial. The rulemakers’ goal was not to have a trial in 
every case, yet it is probably safe to say that the goal was to create the op-
tion for a trial—where merited—in every situation. That presumption was 
behind the design of the original rules. 
                                                                                                                           
 198 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 1937 adoption. 
 199 Similarly, in 1946, Rule 26(b)(1) was amended to clarify that parties could seek inadmis-
sible evidence through discovery. The Advisory Committee note explained, “The purpose of dis-
covery is to allow a broad search for facts, the names of witnesses, or any other matters which 
may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of his case.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory 
committee’s note to 1946 amendment. 
 200 Work product protection, or trial preparation material protection, was codified in 1970. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment. This codification fol-
lowed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hickman v. Taylor in 1947, where the Court ostensi-
bly created that protection. See 329 U.S. 425, 511 (1947). 
 201 Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1897 (1998). Patri-
cia Wald explains that,  
As originally envisioned by its drafters in 1937, the purpose of Rule 56 was to weed 
out frivolous and sham cases, and cases for which the law had a quick and definitive 
answer. . . . “[Through summary judgment,] dilatory tactics resulting from the asser-
tion of unfounded claims or the interposition of specious denials or sham defenses 
can be defeated, parties may be accorded expeditious justice, and some of the pres-
sure on court dockets may be alleviated.” 
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting 10 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY 
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2712, at 563 (2d ed. 1983)). 
 202 See id. For a discussion of the difference between frivolous and meritless claims, see Al-
exander A. Reinert, Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless Litigation, 89 IND. L.J. 
1191, 1191 (2014). 
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Over time, however, that presumption has shifted. Starting in the 1970s, 
the rulemakers began to worry about efficiency and consequently began 
shifting away from the trial presumption. As discussed in Part I, this is also 
the time that a greater number of federal rights came into being and civil 
filing rates increased.203 Moreover, the public began to view litigation more 
skeptically, believing that much of what was occurring was frivolous.204 For 
example, this led the Committee to adopt Rule 11 in 1983, a rule that pro-
vided for mandatory sanctions if a claim was filed frivolously.205 Beyond 
sanctions, however, the Committee’s work with respect to the discovery 
rules aptly displays this shift. 
In 1983, the Committee amended Rule 26(b)(1) to add factors meant to 
aid judges in dealing with what it called “over-discovery.”206 The Commit-
tee further explained that the “new sentence is intended to encourage judges 
to be more aggressive in identifying and discouraging discovery over-
use.”207 The note is silent as to the impact the additional language would 
have on a party’s ability to prepare for trial, but it stated that “the court must 
be careful not to deprive a party of discovery that is reasonably necessary to 
afford a fair opportunity to develop and prepare the case.”208 This statement 
could be read as providing judges with the option to allow discovery to 
move forward in certain cases, even when it might be burdensome, in order 
to allow a case to move forward toward the merits. 
                                                                                                                           
 203 See supra notes 22–59 and accompanying text. 
 204 See supra notes 22–59 and accompanying text. 
 205 See Bruce H. Kobayashi & Jeffrey S. Parker, No Armistice at 11: A Commentary on the 
Supreme Court’s 1993 Amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 3 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 93, 100–01 (1993) (discussing the evolution of Rule 11). Rule 11 was amended again 
in 1993 because of criticism that it created increased “satellite litigation” and had a chilling effect 
on plaintiffs filing novel claims. See Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision to Federal Rule 11, 70 IND. 
L.J. 171, 172–75 (1994) (stating that the 1983 alteration of Rule 11 was in response to concerns 
that judges were inconsistently imposing sanctions against “civil rights plaintiffs more often than 
any other category of civil litigants”). The 1983 Rule was causing “satellite litigation over, for 
example, its terminology and the kind and size of sanctions levied.” Id. at 172. There were also 
concerns that the 1983 Rule was “discourag[ing] plaintiffs from pursuing novel legal theories,” 
and “its application could be disadvantaging resource-poor litigants.” Id. at 174–75. 
 206 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment, subdivision (b): Dis-
covery Scope and Limitations. 
 207 Id. The note also stated that: 
The objective is to guard against redundant or disproportionate discovery by giving 
the court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may be directed to matters 
that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry. . . . The grounds mentioned in the 
amended rule for limiting discovery reflect the existing practice of many courts in 
issuing protective orders under Rule 26(c). On the whole, however, district judges 
have been reluctant to limit the use of the discovery devices. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 208 Id. 
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That potential for concern about the merits, however, was nowhere to 
be found by the year 2000.209 The Committee once again amended the dis-
covery rules, this time to limit the scope of discovery to information rele-
vant to the claims or defenses being made.210 The revised rule allowed a 
judge to expand discovery beyond claims and defenses to subject matter 
upon a showing of good cause.211 The Committee note explained that 
“[c]oncerns about costs and delay of discovery have persisted” in spite of 
previous revisions to the discovery provisions.212 Unlike the changes in 
1983, the Committee made no reference to the potential impact the rule 
would have on parties attempting to resolve the merits of their cases. 
The shift in presumptions about the purpose of discovery vis-à-vis trial 
is equally apparent in the Civil Rules Committee’s most recent proposals. 
Following the Duke Conference on Civil Litigation in 2010, the Civil Rules 
Committee focused on further revising the discovery rules.213 The original 
package of proposals was sweeping. It lowered the presumptive limits on 
depositions, interrogatories, and requests for admission. It also eliminated 
the requesting party’s ability to expand its inquiry beyond its claims or de-
fenses and into the subject matter of the litigation—a feature that was al-
ready only granted when the requesting party could show good cause.214 
And, of course, the most controversial part of the discovery amendments 
introduced proportionality into Rule 26(b)(1).215 
Critics of the recent proposals argue that the specific revisions to Rule 
26(b)(1) provide producing parties with an additional tool to obstruct pro-
duction of information.216 The argument is that defendants will now routine-
ly object to discovery requests on the basis of proportionality.217 A related 
fear is that courts will engage in more cost-shifting, forcing plaintiffs to pay 
for the discovery they are requesting. Critics are concerned that resource-
strapped plaintiffs will now be deterred from bringing claims for fear of the 
discovery costs, and further, that even when plaintiffs bring their claims, 
defendants will use these rules to delay and out-spend the plaintiff.218 
                                                                                                                           
 209 In 1993, the Committee amended the discovery rules to add new 26(a), which provides for 
mandatory initial disclosures. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment. 
This amendment also resulted in the splitting of the factors adopted in 1983 from Rule 26(b)(1) 
into Rule 26(b)(2). See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. 
 210 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 211 Id. 
 212 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment, subdivision (b)(1).  
 213 2014 ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 69, at 79–80. 
 214 Id. 
 215 See supra notes 60–109 and accompanying text. 
 216 2014 ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 69, at 81 (noting the 
divide among plaintiff and defense attorneys regarding the proportionality proposal). 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
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Proponents of these proposals argue that the new rule simply moves 
much of the proportionality analysis that already existed in the rule from 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C) to Rule 26(b)(1).219 The purpose of moving this language 
is not to change discovery burdens, the argument goes; the move is meant to 
remind parties and courts of their duty to keep the discovery proportional 
and to be attentive to cost.220 The parties in favor of this rule change argue 
that discovery costs are so high for many defendants that they settle—not 
because they think they are wrong on the merits, but because the cost of 
litigation is too high to risk an unpredictable trial.221 
Regardless of whether one agrees with the proposition that discovery 
needs to be proportional to the value of the case, the arc of this particular 
rule change bends in the direction of not reaching trial. The Advisory 
Committee note language is telling. The earlier reference to garnering mate-
rial “which may aid a party in the preparation or presentation of his case” is 
gone.222 The note for the current proposal explains that “the information 
explosion of recent decades has greatly increased both the potential cost of 
wide-ranging discovery and the potential for discovery to be used as an in-
strument for delay or oppression.”223 The Committee and its work are no 
longer focused on discovery as a mechanism for a full exchange of infor-
mation that can then lead to a determination of the merits. Instead, it is fo-
cused on lowering the cost of discovery, without any express or even im-
plied reflection on how restrictions on discovery might affect the ability of 
parties to get to trial.224 Again, the efficiency norm is not solely responsible 
for this attitudinal shift, but it is certainly a critical part of the story. 
                                                                                                                           
 219 Id. at 83–84. 
 220 Id. at 84. The Duke Subcommittee stated, “If the expressions of concern reflect wide-
spread disregard of principles that have been in the rules for thirty years, it is time to prompt wide-
spread respect and implementation.” Id. 
 221 Id. at 83. 
 222 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment; see also su-
pra note 199 (quoting language). 
 223 2014 ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 69, at 102 (quoting 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment). 
 224 The Committee is not the only institution that has made this shift. Courts have done so as 
well, for example, in the context of rules governing pleading. In 1944 in Dioguardi v. Durning, 
then-Second Circuit Judge Charles Clark took advantage of the opportunity to clarify what was 
intended by the notice pleading regime ushered in by Rule 8. See 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 
1944). In reversing a district court’s dismissal of the complaint, Judge Clark wrote that “however 
inartistically . . . stated,” the plaintiff had met the requirements of Rule 8 by stating his claim. Id. 
Further, Judge Clark wrote that based on the complaint, he could not “see how the plaintiff may 
properly be deprived of his day in court” to prove his case. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to weigh in on pleading thirteen years later in 1957 in Conley v. Gibson. See 355 U.S. 
41, 47–48 (1957). The Court reversed lower courts’ decisions to dismiss the complaint, noting that 
the “Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by 
counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of the pleading is 
to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.” Id. at 48. Further, the Court explained that notice 
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2. From Plaintiff Receptivity to Skepticism 
This section examines how the current efficiency norm has also con-
tributed to a shift from plaintiff receptivity to plaintiff skepticism. Although 
the civil litigation system used to provide room for the plaintiff to develop 
its case, it now views each of the plaintiff’s steps with skepticism. 
a. The Civil Rules: From Trust to Doubt 
Another presumption that has shifted in civil litigation is how plaintiffs 
are perceived by the system. Court did not blindly defer to plaintiffs in the 
early years of the modern civil litigation regime. Plaintiffs certainly had 
burdens to carry in order to make their way through the system. Yet the 
treatment was still fairly generous.225 Plaintiffs were treated with receptiv-
ity. Once plaintiffs met their threshold requirements, they moved to the next 
stage of litigation. That presumption has shifted, however, to a hearty skep-
ticism of plaintiff requests. 
In the rulemaking context, the current discovery amendments demon-
strate this shift. As discussed in Part III section B, the original rulemakers 
set up a system that would essentially require the production of information 
to parties as long as the information was relevant and not subject to privi-
lege.226 The current attitudes are quite different. For example, the proposed 
amendment to Rule 26(b)(1) would eliminate the ability of plaintiffs to re-
quest information related to the subject matter of their litigation, even if not 
related to the parties’ claims, as long as they can show good cause. Plaintiffs 
will be limited to obtaining information related to their claims.227 This may 
                                                                                                                           
pleading worked because of “the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial proce-
dures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and 
to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.” Id. at 47–48. In other words, like the early 
language of the Committee’s notes to the discovery rules and Judge Clark in Dioguardi, the Con-
ley Court articulated a merits-based trial presumption when it interpreted Rule 8. This presumption 
of trial has shifted as demonstrated in the two most recent Court opinions on pleading. See Iqbal, 
556 U.S. at 677–78; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–57. In both of those cases, the focus shifted from a 
merits-based resolution for the plaintiff to a concern about how discovery costs might force a 
defendant to settle a frivolous claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685–86 (stating that “[l]itigation . . . 
exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources,” requir-
ing the Court to move its focus from to possibility of discovery for plaintiffs to the “burdens of 
discovery” for the defendants); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (explaining that Rule 8 required a strict-
er reading because “the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle 
even anemic cases before reaching” proceedings like summary judgment). Thus, like the Commit-
tee, the Court has shifted its norms about the endgame of civil litigation from a trial on the merits 
to an exit that is distanced from the merits and predominantly about the exit itself. 
 225 Plaintiffs had to meet the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8, for example. 
 226 See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text (discussing the original approach to dis-
covery under Federal Rules). 
 227 2014 ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 69, at 79–81. 
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not seem like a critical change, but it is demonstrative of the shifting pre-
sumptions about plaintiffs’ claims that tend to guide rulemaking today. The 
idea is to limit—within the rules—the plaintiff’s ability to receive whatever 
litigation result the plaintiff seeks. 
Other rules are demonstrative of this skepticism as well. In the 1960s 
the rulemakers created the class action rule. If there were a poster child rule 
for plaintiff receptivity, the class action rule would be it. The rule was 
groundbreaking in its allowance of the innovation of class action joinder, 
especially Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.228 The rule was and remains contro-
versial, but the adoption of the rule is critical for this point, because it repre-
sents the rulemakers’ attitudes about plaintiff claims.229 Rule 23 sits in stark 
contrast to Rule 11, which was adopted almost two decades later. Rule 11 
ushered in a regime of sanctions for parties and their attorneys who were 
thought to be filing excessive and costly frivolous claims.230 The courts’ 
presumption shifted from one of receptivity to the potential for a meritori-
ous claim to suspicion that more claims are now frivolous. Indeed, the pre-
sumptive shift that led to the adoption of Rule 11 may linger behind the 
Civil Rules Committee’s current plans to amend Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure Rule 23.231 Whether the proposal will be guided by a presumption of 
plaintiff skepticism remains to be seen.232 Regardless, the overall trend in 
federal civil rulemaking is to change rules with a skeptical eye toward the 
validity of plaintiffs’ claims. 
b. Courts and Congress: Expansion, Contraction, and Discretion 
Beyond rulemaking, courts have become complicit in this shift. First, 
they have become complicit because of the great amount of discretion now 
                                                                                                                           
 228 Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. 
CT. REV. 337, 363 (“But the great modern innovation in class actions is the dramatic expansion of 
the efficiency-based use of aggregation under Rule 23(b)(3).”). 
 229 It also, importantly, represents a different conception of efficiency. Most certainly the 
rulemakers thought this change would be more efficient for litigation. For a discussion of how 
efficiency is subject to multiple definitions and should not be limited to the current dominant one, 
see supra notes 112–231 and accompanying text and infra notes 233–272 and accompanying text. 
 230 See Kobayashi & Parker, supra note 205, at 100–01 (highlighting the adverse results of 
1983 amendment to Rule 11). 
 231 U.S. COURTS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE–OCTOBER 2014, at 
499–552 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-
rules-civil-procedure-october-2014 [http://perma.cc/G8RH-B9RB] (enclosing Rule 23 Subcommittee 
Report). 
 232 Interestingly, the first subject is class settlement. The Subcommittee report states: “The 
reality is that few certified class actions are tried, and most are settled. The reality may well also 
be that more cases are certified for settlement only than for litigation.” Id. at 500. This is demon-
strative of the previous presumption about civil litigation’s endgame, discussed supra notes 60–
109 and accompanying text. 
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provided to them in the rules. Over the years, the Civil Rules have refrained 
from providing mandatory provisions and have instead given judges guid-
ing principles and discretion. This trend is apparent in the changes to Rule 
37233 and Rule 56.234 As already discussed, judicial attitudes regarding liti-
gation have shifted such that greater discretion in the Rules will tend to re-
sult in greater skepticism of plaintiff requests. 
Courts also demonstrate this shift through their decisions in pre-trial 
dispositions. Summary judgment is the paradigmatic example of this. In the 
early years, judges treated summary judgment (and not plaintiff requests) 
with great skepticism. In fact, then-Judge Charles Clark defended the sum-
mary judgment rule from judicial skepticism. In 1946 in Arnstein v. Por-
ter,235 the Second Circuit majority reversed a district court’s grant of sum-
mary judgment, noting, “We agree that Rule 56 should be cautiously in-
voked to the end that the parties may always be afforded a trial where there 
is a bona fide dispute of facts between them.”236 This skepticism was due, 
according to the court, because the process might devolve into a “trial by 
affidavits . . . which, so the historians tell us, began to be outmoded at 
common law in the 16th century, [and] would, if now revived, often favor 
unduly the party with the more ingenious and better paid lawyer.”237 The 
court feared that if that application of summary judgment were permitted, 
                                                                                                                           
 233 In the 2006 e-discovery amendments, Rule 37(f) was amended to provide that the judge 
could not impose sanctions if electronically stored information was “lost as a result of the routine, 
good-faith operation of an electronic information system,” unless the judge found “exceptional 
circumstances.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f) advisory committee’s note to 2006 amendment, subdivision 
(f). This provision left the judge with the discretion to impose sanctions if those circumstances 
were found. See U.S. COURTS, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE—MAY 
2005, at 83–85 (2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV5-
2005.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZBJ4-SF7X]. 
 234 In 2007, Rule 56 was amended as part of the rules-wide restyling project. For a detailed 
account of these events, see generally Steven S. Gensler, Must, Should, Shall, 43 AKRON L. REV. 
1139, 1139–42 (2010). As part of the restyling, the word “shall” was eliminated as much as possi-
ble from the Federal Rules and replaced with “must” or “should.” Rule 56 originally stated that 
summary judgment “shall” be granted when “there is no genuine issue of material fact.” With the 
restyling, that term was changed to “should.” Id. at 1139–40. Although the restyling was not in-
tended to make any substantive change to the rules, some thought it had. This belief was com-
pounded when the Committee, in a later Rule 56 amendment, asked for commentary as to whether 
the proper word guiding judges should be “must.” In other words, should the judge be required to 
grant summary judgment went there is no genuine issue of material fact or should the judge have 
discretion? Ultimately, after an embattled discussion, the Committee opted to keep the original 
“shall” wording. This left judges with the same limited amount of discretion they possessed before 
the rules were restyled, according to jurisdictional differences. Id. at 1142. 
 235 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 236 Id. at 470 n.16. The court further noted, “We do not believe that, in a case in which the 
decision must turn on the reliability of witnesses, the Supreme Court, by authorizing summary 
judgments, intended to permit a ‘trial by affidavits,’ if either party objects.” Id. at 471. 
 237 Arnstein, 154 F.2d. at 471. 
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“[g]rave injustice might easily result.”238 In response, Judge Clark contend-
ed that the courts’ misapplication of the rule was “ad hoc legislation,” which 
was “dangerous in the [present] case” and “disturbing to the general proce-
dure.”239 This debate represents the initial difficulty that courts had in using 
summary judgment because of receptivity to a plaintiffs’ requests to proceed 
with trial. 
Court skepticism of summary judgment reversed starting with the 1986 
trilogy of summary judgment cases.240 With those cases, summary judgment 
started to become more commonplace. Now, many scholars argue that we 
have an over-zealous application of summary judgment, especially in the 
context of particular substantive claims like employment discrimination.241 
Part and parcel of this acceptance of summary judgment is the skepticism 
with which plaintiffs’ claims are viewed. This makes judges much more 
likely to give summary judgment a more capacious reach and results in 
higher grant rates. This result is indicative of a system that is now quite 
skeptical of plaintiffs’ claims.242 
Finally, Congress has played a part in propagating the shift from plain-
tiff receptivity to skepticism. As discussed in Part II section A,243 the thrust 
of the Rules Enabling Act was to allow plaintiffs to gain access to federal 
                                                                                                                           
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. at 479. 
 240 In that year, the Supreme Court decided Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986), Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), and Anderson v. Liber-
ty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Following those decisions, courts became more receptive to 
summary judgment. Indeed, Justice William Rehnquist asserted in Celotex, “Summary judgment 
procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral 
part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to ‘secure the just, speedy and inexpen-
sive determination of every action.’” 477 U.S. at 327 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). Nonetheless, 
some courts have maintained their skepticism. See Bennett, supra note 160, at 716–17 (concluding 
summary judgment is greatly overused and Rule 56 should be significantly amended, if not elimi-
nated); Susan Taylor Wall, “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary Judgment:” Rethinking 
Motion Practice, 8 S.C. LAW. 29, 29 (1997) (discussing judicial skepticism of summary judgment 
and likening it to a sign in an Alabama state court reflecting this sentiment). 
 241 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal 
Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 764, 766–67 (2007) (questioning the robust use of 
summary judgment in the employment discrimination context and asking: “[W]hat if the judge 
does not realize the differences between those views—his or her perspective and those of a ‘rea-
sonable juror’? What if a judge does not have the humility, self-awareness, or insight to recognize 
the limitations of his or her own perspective?”); Wald, supra note 201, at 1918–30, 1943 (survey-
ing summary judgment cases in the D.C. Circuit and determining that “facts are oversimplified 
and reduced to a minimum in order to comply with the requirements of summary judgment proce-
dure, and as a result there is less information available to future disputants and judges”). 
 242 The move from notice to plausibility pleading under Twombly and Iqbal similarly demon-
strates this shift. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
more defendant-friendly decisions in Twombly and Iqbal). 
 243 See supra notes 60–109 and accompanying text (outlining the early history of Federal 
Rules). 
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court in order to adjudicate their claims. The purpose was to move away 
from technical requirements that might keep unwitting plaintiffs from see-
ing their claims through.244 Further, as discussed in Part I, during the 1960s 
and 1970s, Congress created additional substantive rights for individual 
plaintiffs.245 In some sense, that legislative agenda reflected the kind of re-
ceptivity that this Article describes. 
Recent legislation has changed that tide. As discussed, rulemakers have 
become more skeptical of plaintiffs’ claims. Similarly, Congress has ostensi-
bly moved away from right-creation, and in the procedural realm, it has ac-
tively limited how plaintiffs can bring their claims into federal court. Exam-
ples abound. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act limits a litigant’s 
ability to get to discovery until they overcome hurdles regarding the validity 
of their claims.246 The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”) is another 
example; that statute effectively funneled class actions that were filed in state 
courts into the federal system.247 Congress passed CAFA because it conclud-
ed that states were allowing frivolous and inefficient class actions to pro-
ceed.248 The Prison Litigation Reform Act was passed for similar reasons—
prisoners were supposedly filing wasteful frivolous cases.249 The commonali-
ty of this legislation is a presumed skepticism of certain kinds of plaintiffs’ 
claims, a skepticism that did not historically appear in legislation governing 
procedural doctrine. 
                                                                                                                           
 244 See Coleman, supra note 146, at 264–65 (arguing that the structure of the federal rulemak-
ing bodies benefits better-resourced parties in litigation and marginalizes less-resourced parties 
and their lawyers). 
 245 See supra notes 60–109 and accompanying text (noting an increased federal caseload due 
to new federal legislation providing individuals with substantive rights that could be enforced 
through civil litgation). 
 246 See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text. 
 247 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered 
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 248 Steven M. Puiszis, Developing Trends with the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 40 J. 
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Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 § 2(a)(4))). 
 249 See supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text (discussing Senator Dole’s statements 
regarding the intent of the PLRA). 
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IV. TOWARD RECLAIMING THE EFFICIENCY NORM 
As demonstrated, the current efficiency norm is flawed. First, institu-
tional actors’ version of efficiency is problematic because it leads them to 
focus solely on making each litigation moment cheaper. It undervalues (or 
does not value at all) costs that are more difficult to measure and thus does 
not accurately reflect what is efficient. Second, the presumptions underlying 
the civil litigation system have markedly shifted, and the efficiency norm is 
partly responsible for such shifts. This Part argues that the existing efficiency 
norm and its attendant shifting presumptions have distorted the civil litigation 
system. It then argues in for a reclaimed definition of efficiency and proposes 
specific ways to implement and fortify that revised efficiency norm. 
A. Civil Litigation Distorted 
As a consequence of the current efficiency norm, the presumptions un-
derlying civil litigation have shifted. If these shifting presumptions create 
positive results for the civil litigation system, then perhaps the shifts are 
justified, even if the efficiency definition is problematic. These shifts have 
not created a positive result for the civil litigation system, however. First, as 
these presumptions have shifted, non-public adjudication has become com-
monplace. This decrease in public adjudication has threatened to eliminate a 
key element of our democratic society, and it has, in some cases, stifled the 
development of and consensus around the rule of law.250 Moreover, as these 
presumptions have shifted, the barriers to entry into the civil litigation sys-
tem have risen. This has had a disproportionate effect on the most marginal-
ized litigants. 
The United States courthouse used to be “a symbol of the community, 
of equality, and of justice.”251 The idea that the democratic enterprise was 
well-served by a robust public court system is fading as the civil justice sys-
tem becomes less public and more private.252 As scholars have argued, “If 
one believes in the underlying values of American democracy, [the loss of 
                                                                                                                           
 250 Moohr, supra note 133, at 426–27 (arguing that public judicial adjudication, among other 
things, “educates the public, creates precedent, develops uniform law, and forms public values”). 
 251 Elizabeth Thornburg, Reaping What We Sow: Anti-Litigation Rhetoric, Limited Budgets, 
and Declining Support for Civil Courts, 30 CIV. JUST. Q. 1, 1 (2011). 
 252 Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It’s Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 81, 98 (suggesting that by reducing the court’s role, and thus a public forum’s role, 
in resolving disputes, “we run the risk of finding ourselves without an institution that has the polit-
ical legitimacy to make fact- and law-based decisions when we need them”); Richard C. Reuben, 
Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
279, 317–18 (2004) (arguing that democratic values are threatened by private adjudication meth-
ods like mandatory arbitration); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1675 (2005). 
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the public trial is] deeply troubling . . . .”253 This privatization is not just a 
consequence of alternative dispute resolution; it is also due to a decrease in 
trials and an increase in pre-trial disposition.  
This privatization of the litigation system has other consequences as 
well. The chance for law to develop—and for the community to engage in 
that development—is far lower.254 This means that legal precedent will be 
underdeveloped. It also means that in areas where the public has a distinct 
interest in how the law develops—such as anti-discrimination law—the 
public will not have a chance to engage and learn from the court’s resolu-
tion of claims. That resolution, if any, will be framed by a subset of the 
population, one that may not best reflect society’s values.255 Moreover, 
without the threat of litigation in the public eye, the deterrence value of liti-
gation is largely lost.256 Finally, there are other intangible benefits to a pub-
lic court system such as “training for lawyers and judges, discovery and 
disclosure of facts relevant to public health or government integrity and the 
general support of peace and order.”257 As the civil litigation presumptions 
shift in the name of efficiency and other normative concerns, these ad-
vantages are lost. 
In addition to the loss of the advantages described above, the shifting 
civil litigation presumptions have also resulted in higher (and sometimes 
insurmountable) barriers to marginalized individuals. Changes made under 
the guise of efficiency—ones that are done in order to address the most 
complex and less frequent cases—have a consequence. The consequence is 
that plaintiffs with fewer resources are unable to overcome the barriers to 
justice that have been erected. This arguably means that certain kinds of 
                                                                                                                           
 253 Burbank & Subrin, supra note 9, at 401. 
 254 See Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public Rights, Compelling 
the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 685, 703–11 (2004) (arguing that private 
adjudication, like mandatory arbitration, decreases public knowledge and precedent); Thornburg, 
supra note 251, at 81 (arguing that public litigation, as opposed to private adjudication, produces 
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 255 Robert M. Ackerman, Vanishing Trial, Vanishing Community? The Potential Effect of the 
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Id. 
 256 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 235, 235–40, 261 (1979) (using law and economics to argue that public adjudication creates 
a public good because it creates and enforces rules of law, deterring aberrations). 
 257 Thornburg, supra note 251, at 81. 
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claims are lost. Some of these claims, like discrimination claims, necessari-
ly enforce social norms, meaning that their loss leaves those norms under-
enforced. Other claims, like product-liability claims, enforce regulations 
that resource-strapped agencies may not be able to cover.258 This is not to 
say that all of these claims are meritorious ones or that some of these claims 
are not properly filtered out of the civil litigation system. Rather, the argu-
ment is that the presumptions underlying civil litigation have shifted so far 
that they have potentially eliminated the opportunity for these kinds of 
claims to make it through the federal civil litigation system. That loss is 
traceable, at least in part, to the increased fidelity to the current efficiency 
norm, and it demonstrates that these shifts are not so beneficial. 
B. Toward Reclaiming and Redefining Efficiency 
Efficiency must be reclaimed and redefined. It is not just that the bal-
ance between efficiency and justice needs to be restored.259 That might very 
well be true. But before deciding where to strike that balance, we must first 
have a valid definition of efficiency itself. Because the current efficiency 
norm is a pandemic, affecting all areas of procedural doctrine at all institu-
tional levels, we need to work toward consensus regarding what efficiency 
means.  
Most critically, a reclaimed definition of efficiency has to reflect the 
fact that “efficient” does not equal “cheap.” In other words, making changes 
to the Civil Rules and doctrines in order to simply make litigation cheap-
er—as a matter of a litigant’s financial bottom line—is not acceptable. This 
view of efficiency is over-simplified and, as demonstrated in this Article, 
has contributed to paradigmatic shifts in how our civil litigation system 
functions.260 
Instead of focusing only on the monetary costs associated with civil lit-
igation, a new definition of efficiency must include other costs. For exam-
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ple, if litigation filters out meritorious cases at too great of a rate, or if it 
chills the filing of such cases in the first place, the system loses the potential 
benefit of that claim. That claim has value in terms of deterring other poten-
tial defendants from engaging in potentially unlawful behavior.261 The claim 
also has value because it might result in a clear statement of the law, provid-
ing precedent for others to follow and understand.262 Of course, not all liti-
gation produces these benefits.263 But for the litigation that does, not valu-
ing the cost of the loss of that litigation means that efficiency is not accu-
rately defined. 
Moreover, even when a plaintiff loses, seeing the claim through the lit-
igation process provides a benefit to the system in terms of the individual’s 
ability to abide by the result and the public’s perception of the system’s le-
gitimacy.264 These costs might be difficult to value, but any definition of 
efficiency should still account for them. For example, the accuracy of the 
adjudication of claims might cause a benefit of shifting back towards tradi-
tional civil litigation presumptions. Although this could create costs in 
terms of time spent by the judge or dollars spent by the parties, those costs 
have to be balanced against the benefit that accuracy brings.265 Again, accu-
racy is difficult to measure, but the concept should be included in any esti-
mation of whether a change to procedural doctrine is truly efficient for the 
system.266 Moreover, as one scholar has argued, any litigation system has to 
tolerate some amount of inaccuracy lest the system be too burdened to ever 
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reach a result.267 Procedure, however, provides legitimacy to such out-
comes.268 Thus, the cost of an inaccurate result must be measured, and any 
attempt to offset that cost, whatever it may be, relies on the legitimacy of 
the procedures that get the parties there. Stated differently, there is a cost to 
unjust procedures—that being the legitimacy that inures to a system that 
will inevitably reach inaccurate results. That cost must be valued when de-
termining the efficiency of any particular procedural change. 
So, what does this mean for how the efficiency norm should be re-
defined? In the simplest terms, it means that efficiency—as applied to civil 
litigation—must take account of all of the potential costs and benefits. That 
calculus must attempt to quantify costs and benefits that are difficult to 
quantify, or if it is impossible to measure, then it must find some other way 
to include them in the equation.  
To be sure, no definition of efficiency is going to perfectly capture the 
costs and benefits of each case filed or each rule made. One need only look 
to administrative law to see that this exercise is fraught. One scholar recent-
ly observed that he has refrained from arguing that Civil Rule amendment 
proposals should be subjected to formal cost-benefit analyses like what is 
done in the administrative law context because “such analysis [in that con-
text] . . . has proved to be difficult and inconsistent, because the rulemakers 
lack the information and qualifications to conduct it, and because, even if 
they did not, such a requirement would be the source of substantial delay in 
a process that is already lengthy.”269 This much is probably true, but the re-
cent discovery rules push the definition of efficiency onto the judges, and 
there is a danger that some of the other costs discussed herein (referred to as 
“social benefits”) will receive “short shrift.”270 In other words, efficiency is 
being defined by institutional actors, whether we like it or not; yet, this per-
sistent conception of efficiency is deeply flawed. Thus, a move in the direc-
tion of attempting to better define the word, no matter how imperfect, is a 
step in the right direction. 
C. Explicit Defaults in Rules and Decisionmaking 
As the discussion above demonstrates, it is difficult to arrive at a defi-
nition of efficiency that meets the needs of all subject areas and institutional 
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actors. Nonetheless, the exercise is not completely futile. There is more 
work to be done in confronting the efficiency norm. 
For example, scholars and practitioners should encourage institutions 
like the Civil Rules Committee to articulate a common vision of efficiency. 
This kind of exercise would be useful for rulemakers in making the rules, 
for judges in construing them, and for parties in utilizing them. Congress 
should similarly engage with this question. Or perhaps this is a task for the 
American Bar Association or for some other organized group of lawyers. 
The point is that if positive steps are not taken to define efficiency, the void 
will be filled with the present efficiency norm, and it will continue to im-
pact the civil litigation presumptions discussed above.271 
Further, rulemakers could embed evaluative judgments about efficiency 
into particular rules. For example, in summary judgment, one could imagine a 
part of the rule that encourages (or requires) judges to deny a motion for 
summary judgment where it is a close call as to whether there is a genuine 
dispute of material fact. This rule change would accompany a determination 
that efficiency—as newly defined—requires less summary judgment and 
more trials.272 There are perhaps other places where these kinds of explicit 
presumptions, which act as a guarantor of a newly defined efficiency, could 
be inserted into the rules. They could be placed in the discovery or sanction 
rules, for example. The idea is that once we have arrived at a common defini-
tion of efficiency, there will be ways to bolster that definition. 
CONCLUSION 
The word efficiency has been misused by institutional actors in the 
civil litigation system. Under the shield of the current efficiency norm, civil 
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rule amendments, court decisions, and congressional legislation have coa-
lesced to remake the civil litigation system into a completely different sys-
tem than the one envisioned in the early twentieth century. This Article calls 
for a new vision of efficiency—a robust accounting of costs and benefits, 
not just a resort to trying to achieve the cheapest result out of litigation. 
This new efficiency norm will not necessarily mean a full-throated return to 
the presumptions of the 1930s. The world and litigation have changed too 
much for that. But, this Article argues that a reclaimed efficiency definition 
will necessarily lead to some change—partial shifts back to where we once 
were and perhaps other shifts taking us in a new direction. Either way, the 
result will be a better notion of efficiency because the institutions responsi-
ble for creating procedural rules and doctrines will be working with a more 
accurate definition of a critical normative value. 
  
 
